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Summary findings
A major objective of Viet Nam's transition to a market  *  The private sector is constrained by the lack of an
economy has been to reactivate the private sector in a  independent judiciary, the absence of private land
mixed economy. Several new laws have been introduced  ownership, other uncertainties in property law that limit
in the past five years to implement this policy and to  the development of financial markets, and the inherent
create an enabling environment for the private sector.  bias of the system in favor of the state sector (and
Thuyet reviews some of the more important laws and  collective ownership).
regulations that affect Viet Nam's private sector  *  A law-abiding attitude, equally important to
activities, including laws on real property,  intellectual  development, has been slow to develop.
property, companies, domestic investment, foreign  * Viet Nam's foreign investment process is too
investment, bankruptcy, contracts, and dispute  complicated, and its company law too restrictive. A first
resolution. Anti-monopoly law has not yet been  priority should be to streamline regulations.
introduced in Viet Nam. The issue of competition is  Viet Nam has been slow to privatize its state
addressed in the context  of trade law, the relative roles  enterprises, another step essential for development.
of the state and private sector, and restrictions in  Trade policy also needs to be liberalized.
company law. These areas all establish the foundation of  * Export processing zones may be a useful interim
a legal framework for a market economy. Among  instrument to attract foreign investment but should be
Thuyet's conclusions:  phased out over time. More important in the long term is
e  Viet Nam's legal framework, like China's, is still  a good investment climate resting on a strong legal
influenced by ideology, which causes problems in such  foundation.
areas as private ownership of real property and with such
fundamental legal concepts as "due process of law."
This paper - a product of the Transition Economics Division, Policy Research Department - is part of a larger effort in
the department to understand the legal and institutional requirements for transition from socialism to a market economy.
Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact
Grace Evans, room N1l-041,  telephone 202-458-5783,  fax 202-522-1151  (48 pages).  July 1995.
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- i11 -INTRODUCTION
A major objective of Viet-Nam's  transition to market economy is to reactivate the
private  sector within a "multi-component economy" or mixed economy.  Several new laws
have been introduced in the past five years to implement this policy and create an enabling
environment for the private  sector to formally engage in business in many areas.
Viet-Nam's  private  sector has considerable potential for rapid growth that has been
realized in successes in agriculture,  trade and services,  and is only beginning to make its
presence felt in some light industry subsectors.  Factors  crucial to this  success have been
Vietnamese entrepreneurship,  a literate population,  and a comparative cost advantage in labor
intensive industries.  Unlike other transitional economies in Eastern Europe or China, the
southern half of Viet-Nam is still familiar with the workings of a market economy  - clearly
an added advantage for easier transition.  However,  considerable impediments remain for
further development of the private  sector.  Private investment remains quite low; less than 10
percent of GDP in  1993 and only slightly improved in  1994. A deficient legal framework
made up of complicated regulatory  laws and uncertain substantive laws is perceived by the
private  sector as one of the most serious obstacles to its expansion.1
This paper will review some of the more important laws and regulations  in Viet-Nam
affecting private  sector activities  - including the laws on real property,  intellectual property,
companies law, domestic  investment, foreign investment, bankruptcy,  contracts,  and dispute
resolution.  Although anti-monopoly law has not yet been introduced in Viet-Nam,  the issue
of competition will be addressed in the larger context of current trade law, the relative roles
of state sector versus private sector,  and the restrictions  in the company law. The above
areas establish the foundation of a legal framework for a market economy.  The paper will
also discuss Viet-Nam's  judicial institutions,  including its civil code tradition and socialist
orientation,  the capacity of its court system, and the efficiency of law enforcement.  As in
China, Viet-Nam's  legal framework  is still influenced by ideology, which causes problems in
several areas,  such as private ownership of real property,  and can affect fundamental legal
concepts such as "due process of law".
I.  The Emerging  Private  Sector
Viet-Nam's  transition to a market economy begin in 1989 with a reform program
called Renovation or Doi-Moi.  Initially,  the program  focused on price reform including
exchange rate liberalization  and abolition of subsidies to  state-owned enterprises  (SOE).
l  Viet Nam: Private Sector's perceptions  of Impediments  to Industrial DeveloRment  - A survey done by the
Center for Investment  and Foreign  Trade Development,  for World Bank's  Financial  Sector Mission. Ho Chi Minh
City, April 1994.Subsequently, the Law on Private Business, promulgated  in 1991, formally allowed the
private sector to be involved in business activities for the first time in many years.  Prior to
the Reform(1989),  all industry and trade were stated-owned,  and agriculture was
collectivized. 2 The emergence  of the private sector, rebom in the new legal framework for
transition, has changed the structure of the economy significantly. The cooperative  sector
flourished when the economy  was centrally  planned but collapsed during the years following
the 1989 Reform program. The cooperative  sector contribution  to industrial output fell from
42 percent in 1989 to less than 2 percent in 1993. By contrast, private sector involvement
has grown in many subsectors,  particularly agriculture, trade, and trade services.  SOEs,
however, continue  to dominate  the industrial sector.
Structure
Household business units in the trade sector were the first private undertakings  to
emerge in the urban areas following  the Reform.  They now number about 300,000 units and
form the core of what may be considered Viet-Nam's informal sector.  Under Viet-Nam's
Company  Law (see Section  IV), these household  business units are registered as "individual
businesses" or sole proprietorships.  In the "organized"  or "formal" sector defined as non-
household  businesses, 6,024 units were registered by March 1994. About half of these
businesses  were trade and half were industrial.
Most private industrial units are small.  More than half of the total 2,557 units in
private industry have equity capital of less than dong 500 million (US$50,000),  and fewer
than 500 have equity capital exceeding  dong 5 billion (US$500,000). Under the Company
Law of 1991, the private sector began incorporating  into two French-type limited liability
companies: (i) shareholding  companies  or Societe Anonyme  (SA); and (ii) limited liability
companies  or Societe a Responsabilit6  Limitee (SARL).  Most of the smaller companies
(2,531 units) incorporated  as SARLs to restrict ownership and to preserve their tight
management,  while most larger companies  (91 units) incorporated  as SAs.
2  In the North, the economy was centrally planned in 1955-1956. In the South, following the reunification  in
1975, industry,  trade were nationalized  and farming was collectivized  in  1977-1978.3
Table 1.1
Viet-Nam's  Organized non-Agricultural  Private Sector:  Corporations (SAs and SARLs)
and Sole Proprietorships  (as of March  3,  1994)
Sector  Number of  Registered
Units  Capital
(dong million)
Manufacturing  2,557  622,318
Trade  2,913  965,127
(Foreign Trade)  (14)  (67,948)
Transport,  Tourism,  and other Services  554  574,366
Total  6,024  2,161,811
Source: State Arbitration  Authority, Hanoi;  unpublished data provided during mission.
Private  sector involvement in the industrial sector grew rapidly in 1989-90.  A series
of failures led to a consolidation in 1991-92, reducing both the total number of private units
and their output. As a result, private  industrial output growth has averaged a modest 6
percent p.a.  during the last three years.  Unlike other transition  economies in Eastern
Europe,  Viet-Nam's  private  sector has not been enlarged by privatization of state-owned
enterprises.  Only three SOEs have been designated to be privatized in a pilot program.
In general,  Viet-Nam's  industrial sector is still dominated by SOEs,  although the
private sector is more active in the trade and service sectors.  The dynamism of the trade
sector is evidenced by the increasing number of new shops throughout the country and, more
importantly,  by their increased earnings.  Private sector activities in the trade sector are,
however,  limited to domestic trade.  Current trade laws and regulations practically give
SOEs a monopoly in foreign trade.  Although some 3,000 foreign trade permits  were issued
recently, only  14 were given to the private  sector.
Foreign Investment
A policy milestone in Viet-Nan's  transition toward a market economy was the new
Foreign  Investment Law enacted to attract foreign capital and technology.  The revision of
the Foreign  Direct Investment (FDI) law in 1990 and amendments in  1991, 1992, and  1994
(including an important provision to allow 100 percent foreign-owned  investment) formed a
basis for facilitating FDI.  Viet-Nam's  incentives package for FDI is standard, more or less4
comparable to FDI  incentive systems of other East Asian countries  (see Sec. V, Table 5.1).
Despite these developments,  however, Viet-Nam's  FDI remains constrained by an uncertain
legal system and by complicated regulations regarding investment sanctioning.  Foreign
investment has been most active in two subsectors:  oil and gas and hotel construction.
Project  implementation is slow (Table 1.2) with about 25 percent of the total US$6.7  billion
net (excluding licenses revoked or expired) foreign investments approved through February
1994.3  In manufacturing,  only a small number of projects have been implemented of the
total US$1.7  billion approved.  Most of these are joint-venture  projects (mainly with Korea
and Taiwan) with short gestation periods  involving garment subcontracting, consumer
electronics, and scooters.  An improved regulatory and legal framework may encourage other
foreign investors  to start implementing projects that take longer time to develop.
Table 1.2
Foreign Investment,  1988-1993
|  ~~~~~~~~~(US$  million)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  June
1993
Cumulative Capital Registered  364  903  1,503  2,726  4,663  6,214
(FDI approved)  IlI_I
Cumulative Inflow of FDI  400  600  900  1,500
(Investment  implemented)
Source:  State Committee for Cooperation and Investments  (SCCI), and Viet Nam:
A Developmental Perspective,  prepared for the (Paris) Donor Conference,
Government of Viet-Nam, Hanoi,  September  1993.
Relative Roles of Private Sector and State Sector
One of the chief issues with Viet-Nam's  legal framework for the emerging private
sector is the focus on control rather than on promotion.  Despite the broad policy to promote
a mixed economy ("multi-component economy"),  the current laws attempt to circumscribe
private  sector development without encouraging its growth.  Ideology still influences the legal
system which is biased against the private sector.  A weak legal infrastructure,  including
institutions unwilling or unable to implement the laws, adds to an uncertain, unstable legal
environment.  Domestic investors  in the private sector have to operate in a more restrictive
regulatory framework than foreign investors do, in part because the government continues to
struggle with the philosophical issue of how far a liberated economy and an expanded private
sector can be compatible with a socialist political structure.  Viet-Nam's  policymakers do not
3 Implementation seems accelerated somewhat in 1994 but overall implementation over five years is still slow.
According  to provisional  data  $3.5  billion  or  30%  of a  total  $11 billion  approved  by the  end  of  1994 were
implemented.5
have the same clean slate as their colleagues in Eastern Europe to promote private investment
and private  sector.  The new Constitution of  1992, while introducing a  "multi-component
economy" (or mixed economy),  still proclaims that "people and collective ownership"  (in the
form of state-owned enterprise  and cooperatives) must be the foundations of such an
economy (Art.  15).  Furthermore,  "the state sector will be  strengthened and developed and is
to keep the lead role in the national economy, particularly in crucial areas"  (Art.  19).  As a
result,  domestic investors are not given comparable incentives to those received by foreign
investors,  and the process of investment approval for domestic investors is not as clearly
defined as for FDI.  Investment approval for projects wholly supported by Vietnamese also
involves a time consuming period of investigation including security clearance prior  to
registration preceding project evaluation.  Beyond approval, domestic investors,  like foreign
investors,  have to face a host of regulations affecting implementation including import/export
restrictions,  land regulations,  utilities problems,  a deficient banking/credit  system, and an
uncertain legal framework.  The two new laws, the Company Law and Private Business
Law,  are quite restrictive.  These laws may have helped clarify  the forms of doing business,
but they do not help promote decontrol/deregulation.
Does Legal Framework Matter?
China has experienced continuing economic (growth) success in spite of an imperfect
legal framework.  In contrast,  CEE countries'  poor economic performance despite their better
legal framework  seems to lessen the role of legal framework.  In the case of Viet-Nam,
policy changes to reverse the command system involving making new laws without
improving law enforcement and strengthening other aspects of the legal infrastructure  may
have been sufficient to initiate the transition,  but are not enough for long-term development.
A stable legal framework  to translate policy into a set of rules of law will be necessary to
sustain long-term growth because frequent changes in the legal framework prevent investors
from  making long-term commitments.  Likewise, effective enforcement of the laws,  requiring
an independent and competent court system,  is equally important for a stable and reliable
legal framework.
Viet-Nam's  high growth in the last three years (1991-94) has been concentrated in
agriculture,  mostly in rice production, crude oil, and services.  Manufacturing  industries,  on
the whole,  have shown mixed performance as some industries grew significantly (e.g.,  the
traditional export industries such as processed  seafood and garments under subcontracting
arrangements),  while others stagnated or declined.  Unless Viet-Nam can turn into an oil-
based economy, further economic growth would depend on an expanded foreign trade and a
diversified  manufacturing sector where legal framework does indeed matter. Legal/regulatory
reform  is essential for faster and more diversified investment, both foreign and domestic.
The case for Viet-Nam to strengthen its legal infrastructure  appears to be even
stronger  if it hopes to attract more foreign investment from the West now that the U.S.  trade
embargo has been lifted.  Most of foreign investment implemented so far was from Asian
investors  with Taiwan in the lead.  These investors  share some of Viet-Nam's  culture6
common to Asia and are reputedly skilled in dealing with an informal,  unstructured  legal
system.  The case for Viet-Nam to strengthen its legal system seems to be more necessary
than with China where about two-thirds of FDI have been from overseas Chinese
(particularly from  Hong Kong and Taiwan) who can function in an informal legal
environment.  Yet, the Chinese government also recognized the urgency of completing the
legal framework to support the developing market economy.4
II.  Private Ownership of Real Property
Fundamental Concepts and Current Reform
Viet-Nam's  "property  law" is made up of a number of statutes and decree-laws  (law
passed by the Standing Committee of the National Assembly when the latter is in recess)
including the Land Law,  the Housing Law,  the Decree on Urban Land and Urban Housing
and some relevant parts  of the Family Law.  As Viet-Nam maintains its socialist political
system while opening up its economy, it retains much of its socialist regime of real property
rights,  particularly  the principle of indivisibility of state ownership of land, as stated in the
new Constitution (1992) and the new Land Law of July,  1993.  Partial ownership rights  are
recognized in the form of the rights to use, to usufruct but not to dispose (e.g.,  sell,
donate).5 In order  to initiate transactions in real properties,  the government attempts to
circumvent this legal constraint by allowing "rights to use" for extended periods  of time.
The New Land Law and Problems in Land Use Rights
The new Land Law, promulgated on July 24,  1993 and its attendant application
decree,  gives details on the hierarchy of types of property ownership and sets out the
regulations on the right to use, to inherit,  and to transfer this right.  As in other areas of law,
land law went through an evolution in response to reality and to changing economic,  if not
political, orientation.  Prior  to  1989 Reform, a property  law on land was not necessary
because private,  individual farming was not allowed in rural areas while private business was
almost nonexistent in urban areas.  All land management was done through  administrative
decisions at local government levels.
4 See Peter Harold and Rajiv Lall, China: Reform and Development in 1992-93, World Bank Discussion Paper
No. 215,  August 1993.
S From a  legal  point of view,  a complete ownership would  include the right  to use (usus)  to have usufruct
(fructus) and to dispose including selling/buying (abusus). See for example Mazeau & Charles Lecons de Droit Civil
(Tome 11,  Vol. II:  Droit de Propri6te), 7e edition,  Montchestien, Paris 1992. The right to abusus is not recognized
in Vietnam or in China.  Article 73 of Vietnam's  Land Law recognizes the right to use, to transfer the right to use
and the right to usufruct.7
The Land Law categorizes six types of land for the purposes of charging fees for the
right to use, for property tax,  rentals and compensation in case of retrieval  ( re-
expropriation).  The six categories are 1) agricultural  land, 2) forest land, 3) rural
settlements,  4) urban  land, 5) land for specialized uses, and 6) unutilized (green field) land.
There is a basic rent schedule for each region which may change over time.  The law spells
out the land use right consisting of (a) the right to use,  (b) the right to transfer  land use
rights,  and (c) the right to usufruct (to enjoy the fruits of labor, the return to investment in
the land.)  In practice,  until recently most home owners in urban areas paid property tax on
land but not fees for the right to use.  The government,  however,  charged a 20 percent fee
for the transfer of the right to use when the house is transferred.  The fee was paid by the
seller.  These fees varied according to the zone but were not excessive as compared to the
land value in comparable cities elsewhere.  Two new laws, in the form of decree/circulars,
have changed the land use rights situation in Viet-Nam.  Land use for business purposes,
industrial enterprises,  and commercial construction  are especially effected.  The first  law,
Circular No. 02 by the Finance Ministry,  requires the collection of  100 percent of fees
assessed for land use rights to be paid by the rights holder or  seller.  The new fees charged
for land use rights are very  high.  In some areas in Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon), the fee may
be as high as $1300 per  square meter.  This  decision has caused strong protests  from
homeowners.  The city of Saigon has petitioned the central government to review and rescind
the circular.  The new decision has also frozen the real property market because the new
regulation on land use rights has pushed up real estate prices enormously.
The second law, Decree No.  18, February  13, 1995 and applicable retroactively to
January  1,  1995, requires all land use rights on commercial properties  to be transformed  into
land lease (rentals) and has caused an even stronger protest and created considerable
confusion.  The new regulation retrieved or re-expropriated  the land already given to
business people.  These people had paid fees for land use rights  when they were "assigned"
the land for long term use, but now they have lost these rights.  The new regulation nullifies
the quasi-ownership of the land intended under the concept of long-term land use rights.  The
new regulation is causing disturbances in the financial sector because banks no longer accept
land use rights as collateral for loans.  In fact, some banks have started to recall loans
previously made on the basis of land use rights.  The new regulation also raised the issue of
land contributed as equity by the Vietnamese counterparts  in joint  ventures with foreign
investors  (see Section V).  Now,  this value is reduced to the rentals the Vietnamese have to
pay to the government,  not the land use rights  whose value normally  is greater  than the
rents.
The land use policy as embodied in the new Land Law is still tentative. While the
provisions on the right to use rural land are fairly clear,  the provisions  affecting urban land
are vague and undeterrnined reflecting difficult, unresolved problems (e.g.  multiple titles on
the same property)  involved in urban  land policy.
The new regulation on land use rights on commercial properties  has made the land
law more unstable.  The law provides  a renewable 20 years period of land tenure for annual8
crops and 50 years for perennial crops (art. 20) but has no similar provisions  for urban  land.
In the rural areas,  each family can be allocated a maximum of three hectares for annual
crops.  In the South,  where land is still abundant, this restrictive provision may impact
negatively on agricultural output and productivity as it would prevent efficient use of
mechanized agricultural  machinery and implements.  The area limit for a perennial crop is to
be determined,  presumably case by case.  Land allocation for  settlement in the rural areas is
set at a maximum of 400 square meters for each family or 800 square meters for the more
traditional,  multi-generation family.  Again, this provision may be appropriate for the densely
populated rural areas in the North but seems too restrictive for the rural areas in the South.
Changes in Housing Policy
Socialist reform campaigns undertaken in the 1950s in the North  and late 1970s
in the South brought under  state ownership large commercial properties  throughout the
country and redistributed residential housing, causing major redistribution of wealth.  As a
result of each reform campaign, each family was allocated or reallocated a dwelling of the
size proportional  to the number of members in the family.  Multi-family  houses are
especially common in Hanoi where new housing construction cannot keep up with a fast
growing population.  For forty years prior to the Reform, there was virtually no real estate
market in the North where land belongs to the State and housing is provided by the State
either free or at a subsidized rent.  These properties  were not transferable.
The  1989 Reform changed the housing policy and made individuals responsible for
their own housing.  A provision  in the new law on urban  land and urban housing (see below)
allows those currently  occupying allocated housing to re-register  and to be issued a certificate
of ownership.  This  transforms  the status of tenant to homeowner for the majority of people
in the North.  Since the ownership is transferable,  the new law creates a real estate market
for the first time in the North.
In the South, the more gentle socialist reform campaign in the late  1970's brought to
state management (expropriation) for redistribution not all real properties  as happened earlier
in the North but only those belonging to the refugees, high official of previous nationalist
governments, and large properties  of rich people.  Perhaps  up to 40 percent of the total value
of real property  in urban areas have been affected this way.  Most homeowners who stayed
in the country after the Northern government  took over the South can still keep their  houses.
Therefore,  a limited real state market always existed in the South, and transactions in the
past were  often done by private  sale act ("acte sous-seeing prive").  Under  implementation
of the new law on urban land and housing to re-register  all real properties,  this and similar
types of private transaction documents will likely become a source of litigation.
Law on Private House and Ownership of the House
The Law on Private House (Housing Law),  promulgated on March  26,  1991, defines
the ownership for the construction and improvements (the "habitation" or house) on the9
tenured land including the right to use, to transfer,  and to mortgage the property6 (art.  17).
Because all land belongs to the state, a person can own a home but not the land underneath.
But even ownership of the house continues to be an issue for a large number of properties as
a result of successive socialist reform campaigns that redistributed housing without any
formal,  legal documentation.
A central objective of the Housing Law is to clarify the ownership status of private
dwellings by listing the kind of ownership papers to be accepted as legal titles.  But the law
apparently failed to settle ownership controversies arising out multiple titles situations.  A
new law on Urban Land and Urban Housing in the form  of a decree (Decree 60/CP,  July 5,
1994) attempts to address the issue in greater detail.  Both the law and the decree explicitly
deal with the status of a great number of houses expropriated (or "managed" by the State) in
the South following the reunification in  1975.  These houses and the land to which the houses
are attached used to belong to former South Vietnamese government employees,  army
officers who were taken to Reeducation Camps,  or former business people whose properties
were subject to the 1979 "socialist reform of private property"  (expropriation) program.
Parallel to the "Renovation" Reform Program  implemented in 1989-90, these properties  are
in principle to be returned  in part or in their entirety to the original owner if the properties
have not been sold.  In practice,  few were returned because most had been transferred  one or
more times.  Attempts by previous  owners to recover their expropriated houses are still
ongoing.  The Housing Law also  "regularizes"  property right for occupants of houses taken
from absentee owners (people who left the country without permission  - mainly "boat
people",  people who had to donate their houses to the government prior to leaving the
country legally, etc.,  Chapter V of Housing Law).  To acknowledge their contribution to
public service or to revolutionary causes,  the new occupants, usually government/party
officials,  were subsequently allowed to purchase the property at prices lower than market
price.  (A schedule of discounted prices is published.)  With these provisions,  the net effect
of the Housing Law is to legalize a de facto redistribution of real property in the urban area.
In the past two or three years a great number of these houses have been sold several times,
thus creating a market for higher end real properties  in major urban areas.
Financing  the Acquisition  of Property
Commercial property.  A system of formal finance for real property is not well
developed in Viet-Nam in part because of the absence of clear law and regulations on urban
land use rights.  Commercial property development is lagging behind the demand derived by
increased investment in other sectors.  As a result, most of the recent increases in
construction of commercial properties  were made of small scale renovation of existing
commercial units and financed by retained earnings.  The few large commercial properties
currently  under construction or being planned are all joint-ventures  between SOEs and
foreign investors where the land use rights are well documented because they belong to a
6  Article 17: "owner  of the house  has the right to use, to rent, to mortgage, or to transfer  ownership  to other
people'.10
state organization.  In most joint-ventures  in Viet-Nam, the local partners contribution to
equity is always some land use rights to be evaluated in dollar equivalent.  The value of such
land use rights is the subject of bargaining  between the local partners and the foreign
investors as there is no criteria  for appraisal.  In this way, a limited market for land use
rights has been created, but this market provides  no reliable information on land value in
general as the land is often overvalued in joint  venture contracts.  The practice of substituting
land (or land use rights) for equity by SOEs has distorted real property markets.
Viet-Nam's  laws do not distinguish between commercial properties  and residential
properties.  In principle, the mortgages of real property are legally possible for both.  The
legal basis for such mortgages can be construed through the Land Law (Art. 3) for pledging
the right to use, the Housing Law  (Art 7) for pledging the house attached to the land.  In
practice,  mortgages have been rare because of the difficulties in ascertaining title and
problems involved in foreclosures.  The problem of multiplicity of titles is most serious in
urban areas of the South where a real property may carry several titles,  all authentic or
'authenticated'  by different government agencies following the reunification of the country in
1975.  The new Law on Urban Land and Urban Housing attempts to establish clear title for
each real property by way of re-registration.  The law specifies the types of previously issued
ownership papers  that are acceptable for the purpose of re-registration.  A new certificate of
ownership (or title) will be issued to replace all the other ownership papers issued under
previous laws and governments.  Since the law is new, it is not possible to gauge whether it
will effectively resolve the issue of titles on urban properties.  Likewise, it will be some time
before the new law will have an impact on expanding commercial property  financing.
Some domestic banks in Ho Chi Minh City started on an experimental basis to accept
ownership papers on residential houses and commercial buildings to establish collateral for
short term loans.  Similarly, land use rights have been used on a trial basis by a few banks,
in part because the law on urban land is only recently introduced.  A system of recording
and documenting the rights to use a specific piece of land is still to be developed and detailed
procedure on mortgages is still to be drafted.  All three real property  laws, namely the Land
Law,  the Housing Law and the most recent Law on Urban Land and Urban Housing,  only
state the principle of mortgageability of real estate with no clear procedure on how this can
be done.  The new regulation on land use rights,  as mentioned above, effectively disrupted
banks from using land use rights as collateral.
Residential property.  Financing for both existing and newly constructed residential
property  has been made by cash through savings or informal credits.  As with commercial
properties,  mortgages are rare.  Until the transfer of land use rights become more familiar
and the issue of clear titles is resolved,  transactions will continue to be on a cash basis.
Term  financing by banks generally has not been developed significantly in Viet-Nam;  for
housing it is virtually nonexistent.  Currently three banks lend to the housing sector, but they11
make very few loans for housing purchases7. Primarily  they finance working capital for
construction firms  who are often shareholders of the banks.  Examples are the new
Buidebank and Habubank.  The largest housing bank,  the Bank for Investment and
Development of Viet-Nam (BIDV),  receives funding mainly from the budget and makes
medium- and long term-loans to SOEs.  Private construction firms,  like individuals, have had
little access to fornal  housing finance.  Following a scheme practiced  in France  ("Plan
d'Epargne"),  the Habubank and BIDV introduced saving-for-loan schemes intended for
households to buy or build housing.  The schemes require participants to save for at least one
year at which time they can withdraw their saving and borrow an equal amount.  The
schemes are functioning on a modest scale because the level of private saving is generally
low.
Mortgages  on residential houses are practically unavailable because the laws are
deficient and confusing and because of difficulties in foreclosure of collateral.  The laws on
mortgages and pledging properties  are not at all clear. They are treated under "Economic
Contracts"  (Art. 2) where the jurisdiction  belongs to economic arbitrators  (now economic
courts) and under  "Civil Contract"  (Arts.  30-34 of a separate law) where litigations are to be
handled by the regular  People's  Courts.  Difficulties in foreclosures,  particularly  enforcement
of court orders,  is reportedly a more serious problem that discourages banks from financing
real estate.  The lack of experience and inadequate legal training  of the judges  and arbitrators
contribute to the weakness of Viet-Nam's  current law enforcement.  The few commercial
banks that offered loans secured by collateral based on real property preferred  to come to the
People's  Committee at the district level (district government) instead of the court to enforce
the foreclosures.
mI. Intellectual  Property  and Transfer of Technology
The Law on Intellectual Property
Viet-Nam's  new Law on Intellectual Property and Foreign Investment Law (see
Section V) were the first  legal reforms  designed to attract foreign investment.  The
government realized during reform debate the importance foreign investors attach to
intellectual property protection.  The government wanted to attract back the multinational
companies (MNC) that had operated in the South but left the country in 1975 following the
reunification of Viet-Nam.  These MNCs were  mainly in pharmaceutical,  brand  name
consumer goods, and others  whose proprietary  technology and brand  names require effective
7For more detail see Viet-Namn: Financial Sector Review,  Sept.  1994, World Bank Report  No.  13135-VN,
Chap.  VI, Section D.  Section C of the same chapter discusses the problems of term financing for industry/trade
as mentioned  above.12
protection.  Viet-Nam's  new law on protection of intellectual property,  promulgated in  1989,
has features common to Western countries'  laws.  The country is also a signatory of
international agreements on intellectual property  (see below).
The new legal framework for intellectual property protection is broader than the pre-
reform system.  Many elements like patents were either not treated under the old,
"traditional" socialist legal system 8 or treated differently from the market oriented laws,
e.g.,  the concept of copyrights. Under the traditional socialist system of Viet-Nam prior  to
1989, author's  works are the property of the state which pays stipulated fees  - usually per
page - for the writing.  In the general area of intellectual property,  Viet-Nam's  legal
reforms  roughly parallel China's  efforts9 both in areas covered and in terms of timing
(around  1989-1990).
In addition to trade marks which are the most important intellectual property  in the
present context of Viet-Nam's  transition,  various ordinances and decrees 10 protects four
other intellectual properties:  inventions/patents,  utility solutions, industrial  designs, and
appellation of origin of products."1 Another category called "industrial secret"  (trade
secret) was added in the Decree 201 HDBT, December 28,  1988 on Transfer of Technology
through  licensing although this category was not defined as the other five.  Current laws
provided the rights to possession,  to use, and to transfer over the protected objects.
8 Prior  to the country's  unification  in  1975, South  Viet Nam  with  its market  economy had  since  1950s a
comprehensive legal system protecting intellectual  property and, as a result  tens of thousands of trademarks  and
patents  has been  issued.  North  Viet  Nam  also had  its  first laws  in the  late  1950s to regulate  trademarks  but
implementation rules were not promulgated until 1980s and data on the number of trademarks registered during the
war time are  not available.
9  See for example Ralph  H. Folson,  John H.  Minan and  Lee Ann Oho,  Law and  Politics  in the People's
Republic of China,  West Publishing Company,  1992, Chapter IX.
10 All five categories are governed by Decree 84 HDBT, March 20,  1990 on Protection of Intellectual Property
and  Decree  201  HDBT, December  28,  1988 and  Arrete 49 HDBT,  April 3,  1991 on Transfer  of Technology
amending the original decree 197 HDBT, December 14, 1982. These texts establish both substantive and procedural
laws for intellectual  property protection.
11  Trademark.  A  symbol  that  is  used  to distinguish  goods or  services  of  the  same kind  from  different
production  or commercial  units;
Inventions. A technical solution that presents "world-wide novelty" and represents an inventive step applicable in
a socio-economic  field;
Utility solutions. The application of an old (patentable) technology  in a new and previously  unused way in Viet-
Nam.  A registrant can obtain a certificate  which protects the new application  for six years;
Industrial designs. The specific appearance of a product embodied by lines,  three-dimensional  forms, colors or
a combination of these, which  is new on a world-wide basis and capable of serving as a pattern for a product of
industry or handicraft;  and
Appellation of origin. The geographical name of a country or locality which  serves to designate the origin of a
product manufactured in that county or locality, provided that its qualities and characteristics  are due exclusively
or essentially  to the geographical environment,  including natural or human factors, or  a combination thereof.13
Under the new laws, about 40,000 trademarks  have been registered.  Other
categories registered  include less than a thousand each.  All trademarks  filed with the
Government of South Viet-Nam prior  to 1975 have to be refiled at the National Office of
Invention (NOI) in Hanoi,  which is in charge of intellectual property  protection.
Characteristics and Issues
Viet-Nam's  system of intellectual property protection adopts the "first to file" rule for
the most part while most other countries adopt the "first to use" rule.  The use of the "first
to file" rule could create litigation over an intellectual property that was pirated but  "properly
filed" prior  to the filing by the real,  authentic foreign owner.  Two measures were taken to
deal with this problem:  1) those who have utilized the property prior  to and independently of
the applicant for protection will have the right to continue the use of the property but are not
allowed to extend the period for utilization or transfer  it; 2) a period of grace was given by
the government for foreign owners to file their trademark on the basis of evidence of their
being the "first to use" to accommodate the legal practice of their home country.  This
measure,  of course,  will not settle the problem.
As in other legal fields of Viet-Nam,  socialist features in this area can be viewed as
of a cosmetic nature but can also be used to create substantial regulatory impediments.  For
example, as the law stipulates,  an owner of an intellectual right "is required to use or
transfer  intellectual property  in Viet-Nam in a way compatible with the need of social and
economic development of the country"  (Article  13, Obligations of Intellectual Property
Owners  - Decree-Law No.  13 LCT/HDNN8,  November 2,  1989).  The letter and spirit of
this type of legal language are open to wide discretion for implementation agencies to
infringe upon the rights to protection.
Another potential problem lies in the provision that intellectual property can be
expropriated if the Chairman of the State Committee for Science -now  the Minister for
Science and Environment-who  is charged with overseeing the implementation of government
policy in this field,  "considering it necessary to use the protected invention, utility solution or
industrial design for Viet-Nam's  national defense or  security or the prevention  of treatment
of human diseases or  for other vital interests."  Despite a provision for adequate
compensation, the possibility of expropriation casts a shadow of uncertainty on Viet-Nam's
policy on intellectual property.
Enforcement of the  Laws on Protection of Intellectual Property
Apart from  some socialist elements as mentioned, Viet-Nam's  laws and regulation on
intellectual property  rights have followed principles that are common to Western laws.  The
duration of protection is generally  15 years from filing date (China also has 15 years
duration).  Viet-Nam is a signatory of the Paris Convention, the Madrid Agreement,  and the14
Stockholm Convention.12 In order to activate any of these agreements or any bilateral
agreements for securing protection or negotiation over technology transfer,  the foreign party
has to mention its adherence to these specific agreements in the application letter.  Because
of the newness of the field in relation to the country's  transition to market economy, Viet-
Nam's  legal documentation on intellectual property protection is confusing and should be
strengthened.  Currently a foreign owner of the intellectual property has to refer to numerous
laws and regulations,  including both the Decree-Law on Intellectual Property  Rights and the
Law on Technology Transfer,  and to make several application arretes for adequate coverage
of the subject.  The Law on Technology Transfer  also overlaps with another law on
"Acquisition of Technology through Licensing." 13
Enforcement  of the laws on protection of intellectual property is probably the
weakest of all as evidenced by the proliferation  of faked brand name consumer goods in the
markets of major cities.  In principle, protection against infringements can be sought first
through the NOI which has no power to grant compensation for loss but can grant injunctions
against the infringer and prevent future infringements.  For compensation, remedies  in
principle can be sought through the People's  Court  system. As Viet-Nam has just  begun to
reintroduce its market-oriented  legal system,  its courts have but limited experience in dealing
with these and other commercial matters.
Relevance of law on intellectual property
Research on intellectual property protection has focused primarily on industrial
economies where the need for and the laws of protection are most relevant. 14 At its
present stage of development where research and development (R&D) activities are
underdeveloped,  Viet-Nam would benefit little from the laws including the intemational
conventions and agreements,  other than for a range of small patents to protect the results of
home grown research activities.  Regarding transfer of technology, the issue is not so much
12 The Paris  Convention for the  Protection of Industrial  Property (March  20,  1883) allows the owner of a
trademark to claim a priority in a foreign country to the date of the initial filing in its home country.  At present,
there  are  more than  80  signatories  to the  Paris  Convention.  The  Madrid  Agreement  (April  14,  1891) allows
signatory parties who have registered a trademark in their home countries to register the trademark in all member
countries by depositing a certificate of registration with the central registration bureau in Berne, Switzerland.  The
Stockholm  Convention (July  14,  1967) established  the World Intellectual  Property  Organization  (WIPO), a  UN
organization  which  offers  registration  services  for  intellectual  property  and  which  facilitates  the  transfer  of
intellectual property  from developed countries to the developing  world.
13 Several  economic issues on this  subject are  discussed  in Technology  Transfer  to Viet Nam:  An Interim
Report,  Research  Policy Institute,  University  of Lund, Sweden,  and Institute  for Science  Management,  Hanoi,
Vietnam. Discussion paper No.181,  1987, and Technology Transfer to Vietnam, Historical and Conceptual Aspects.
by Nguyen Than Ha, Research  Policy Institute,  University  of Lund, Sweden, June  1989.
14  For  a  Survey of  Literature  see  Wolfgang E.  Siebeck  (editor),  Strengthening  Protection  of  Intellectual
Property  in Developing Countries: A Survey of the Literature.  World Bank Discussion Paper No.  112,  1990. The
Study has a very extensive bibliography.15
legal as it is economic. Viet-Nam's  current  low absorptive capacity due to deficient
technological infrastructure  (R&D) and deep-rooted inefficiency of SOEs make it difficult to
transfer and to master new technology.  Adhering to international protection conventions and
introducing its own laws to protect intellectual property,  on the other hand,  would facilitate
the flow of FDI and transfer  of technology in the R&D-intensive sub-sectors such as
pharmaceutical  and other chemicals where a good legal framework to protect proprietary
technology  is critical.
IV.  Company Law
The Need for Legal Forms to Develop Private Business
Company laws modeled on French  saws (Droit de Societe) were in application in both
North and South Viet-Nam prior  to the socialist government coming to power.  These laws
were never formally abrogated but became irrelevant and remained dormant during the
decades of a centrally planned economy where private companies were dissolved or
expropriated.  In keeping with socialist tradition,  practically all trade and production
activities were organized into large state corporations  ("general state corporations")  or
cooperatives formed by administrative decisions.  Real private sector economic activities were
reduced to an insignificant level.
Following the 1989 Reform,  the private  sector re-emerged even though SOEs still
dominate important sectors of the economy.  The surge of private sector activities in trade
and in light industries in urban areas,  especially in cities of the South,  raised the need to
reintroduce company law in order  to regulate private business.  Company law is also needed
to organize local businesses in proper  form in anticipation of joint ventures between the
private  sector and foreign investors.  Currently,  most joint ventures are being formed with
SOEs.
Law on Private Business and the Law on Encouragement of Domestic Investment
The re-emergence of private businesses in Viet-Nam was initiated by the Law on
Private Business (enacted December 2,  1990 to take effect on April  15, 1991).  This  law
recognizes the right of the citizens to engage in private  commercial activities.  In effect, the
law recreated Viet-Nam's  private  sector that had been virtually wiped out during the long
years of a centrally planned economy.
In addition to allowing the private sector to do business,  the law establishes the rules
for setting up business under  sole proprietorship.  As with corporations,  the law on sole
proprietorship  is very restrictive.  For example, a business license for  sole proprietorship  to
engage in a routine activity such as an import/export  trading enterprise  or an agency for
international travel  requires approval by the prime minister.  Furthermore,  there is a list of
required minimum capital for all business/professions  in eighteen groups,  and it covers16
hundreds of subgroups  from services to restaurants  ($2,500 equivalent) to mechanics
workshops  ($8,000 equivalent). This list is to be updated from time to time and is used as
criteria to determine if a private business is subject to this law.  Businesses having a capital
smaller than these minima are regulated separately, presumably by local government
decisions.  Under the Law on Private Business,  8,000 sole proprietorships,  primarily small
family businesses,  have been registered.
To the extent that the country still remains socialist,  a law that permits private
business perhaps makes sense as it legalizes private business in spite of socialist ideology.  In
a more mature market economy, such a law is simply redundant as private business is a
matter of "natural law" and routinely practiced.  As Viet-Nam's  emerging  market economy
matures with time,  this law should be abrogated as a further step toward private  sector
deregulation.
Beginning January  1, 1995, domestic investors could benefit from tax incentives set
forth  in the Law on Encouragement  of Domestic Investment (Domestic Investment Law).
The law was passed on June 22,  1994, to take effect January  1, 1995, and was enacted to
respond to complaints from  Vietnamese business people about a bias in favor of foreign
investors.  Tax incentives for domestic investors are:  1) A one to two year reduction of 50
percent  of the tax rate for corporate  income tax.  In addition,  investments in underdeveloped
regions  such as highland areas may receive an exemption for one to two years.  2) A three
year income tax holiday is given for distributed  dividends.  3) Duty-free imports of
machinery and equipment are allowed.  As with foreign investments,  many priority industries
where  special incentives are to be given are also included in the law.  On the whole,  the
incentives package for domestic investors is not as generous as for foreign investors  but
reduces bias against domestic private business.  The law also allows overseas Vietnamese to
invest in Viet-Nam as domestic investors,  but they have the right to transfer capital and
profits  back overseas.
Company  Law
Enacted in December 21, 1990 to take effect on April 1991, Viet-Nam's new
Company  Law, modeled  on the French concept  of the corporation, sets out two types of
companies: the "shareholding  company" similar to the "Soci6t6  Anonyme (SA)"- and the
"limited responsibility  company" similar to the "Societe  a Responsabilit6  Limit6e
SARL). 15 Both types of companies  are limited liability companies.  The Private Business
Enterprise (PBE) is a third form of business regulated  by a separate law, and essentially  it is
a form of sole proprietorship.  Unlike the French company law on Societes Commerciales,
Vietnamese  law and regulations  on corporations are restrictive and add to the many
impediments  already constraining  an otherwise promising  private sector.  All three forms of
15 See for example Georges Ripert & Rene Roblot, Traite de Droit Commercial  Paris, Librairie de Droit et
de Jurisprudence,  1991.17
companies are not open to foreign investors who are regulated separately by the Foreign
Investment Law (see Section V).
Despite considerable restrictions  by the law,  11,200 private companies have been
formed in the three years since the promulgation of the Company Law.  A few of these
emerging private firms  have been fast-growing,  using thousands of workers.  The majority of
these newly formed companies are in the South where a considerable pool of private
entrepreneurship  still existed despite 17 years of a centrally planned economy.
The Shareholding Company (or Societe Anonyme, SA)
Several of the provisions  of the Company Law,  including regulations regarding
business registration,  changes of business category,  and dissolution, are applicable to both
the SA and the SARL.  While the SARL, with its simplified regulations and reporting
requirements,  is intended for small/medium companies, the SA is the form  normally adopted
by larger enterprises  where the shares can be transferred  more easily.' 6 With the
development of the stock market in perspective,  the SA is also the more important form  of
corporation  because its shares are freely transferable.  Currently,  about 100 large enterprises
have been formed as Sas, mostly in the South.  Like sole proprietorships  and SARLs,
shareholding companies are subject to several subsector restrictions  reflecting a policy
leaning more on control than on promotion.  To make the SA and other forms of
incorporation useful instruments to expand the private sector,  these restrictions  should be
removed.
Capital and Share Requirements.  A major restriction is the minimum capital
requirement  ("statutory capital") as distinct from  paid-in capital,  specified for each type of
business (eighteen groups).  The actual or paid-in capital (called "legal capital" in the law) is
to be 30 percent of the statutory capital for SA, but  100 percent for SARL.  Capital
contributions can be either in cash or in kind.  For an SA, the minimum capital requirement
ranges from $5,000 equivalent for animal husbandry to $50,000 for most small/medium
industries,  to $150,000  for mining and metallurgy industry.  The ownership  structure as
specified in the law is not totally flexible because the SA founders must subscribe an
aggregated minimum of 20 percent  of total shares value, and the remaining can be opened to
public subscription.  The SA cannot issue bonds or debentures immediately but only two
years after the "company has been efficiently managed" and "proves its necessity to embark
on debt financing due to expansion."  This provision in effect prevents all initial leverage
fmancing, except perhaps by way of direct project financing by financial intermediaries.  The
provision  can also be open to corruption  as the permission to issue bonds or debentures will
16 Shares  in  a  SARL are  called  "part  social"  can  be  sold  to  outsiders  only  with  agreement  by  3/4  of
shareholders.  Shares in a SA are called  "action" ca be freely transacted,  therefore,  the name of SA for Societe
Anonyme [Anonymous (Shares) Company].  The Vietnamese change this name and called Shareholding Company.18
be based on judgments made by government  bureaucrats as to whether the enterprise is
sufficiently  efficient to warrant expansion.
Corporate Governance. In the case of Viet-Nam in transition where a capital market
is yet to develop, legal framework  affecting direct monitoring  and control by shareholders  is
the most important  mechanism  of corporate governance. Viet-Nam's law treats the all
important  issue of voting rights with no details other than stating that "shareholders  have the
right to vote and their number of votes is proportional to their capital contributed"(Art.8,
Company  Law). Presumably  this means a system of one share one vote.  Under the
Company  Law on SAs, a board of directors of three to twelve members is elected by the
general assembly  of shareholders  which requires a very high quorum of 75 percent which
would give minority shareholders  greater veto power.  This may not be appropriate for an
efficient decision making process of the company  if the mode of privatization  results in a
dispersed ownership.  The law relegates the majority rules for voting to the company  by-laws
which in the current context of Viet-Nam may not be appropriate because the legal profession
is not well developed. For the time being, these rules should be written in the law itself.
The law does not explicitly provide for inclusion  of outside directors although  this can
be accomplished  by a "nominal" acquisition  of shares.  Including  outside directors would be
useful in the case of a company  privatized by selling shares only to the company's employees
as envisaged in Viet-Nam. The Board of Management  is not involved  in day-to-day
operations which are assumed  by a Director General, a position sometimes  is overlapping
with that of the Board Chairman. Viet-Nam's Company  Law provides for independent
controllers elected by the General Assembly  to assess the company's financial  accounts.  In
this sense, the controller's job resembles the function  of an independent  auditor.
The Societe a ResponsibilitW  Limitee (SARL)
Viet-Nam's name  for the second  type of corporation, "CONG-TY  TRACH-NHIEM
HW-HAN,"  is a textual  translation of the full French phrase for SARL.  Conceptually,  the
SARL has intermediate  characteristics  between the French concepts  of corporation of persons
(soci6te  de personnes)1 7 and corporation of capital (societ6  de capitaux)  such as the SA. In
terms of liability, the SARL is similar to the SA.  Unlike an SA which can choose any name
for the corporation, a SARL must use its main activity designation  (e.g. "Trading  Co") or
the names(s) of its shareholders  for the company  name.  As with other forms of company, a
SARL is subject to minimum capital requirement  for each type of business. The amount of
minimum  capital specified for SARL is about 75 percent of that required for a similar
business under SA.  Transfer of SARL shares to outsiders requires approval of shareholders
who represent at least three-fourths of total statutory  capital.  In part because of its simplified
regulations  and reporting requirements, SARL has been the most popular form of corporation
17  For details, see for example, Alfred Jauffret,  Manuel de Droit Commercial,  Paris, Editions LGDJ,  1991 or
G. Ripert and Roblot,  Traite de Droit Commercial.  Op.Cit.19
among domestic investors.  About 2,500 companies have been formed under SARL since
1991 when the Company Law became effective.
Corporate governance  of a SARL under the Vietnamese Company Law differentiates
between a small SARL of less than 12 members and a larger SARL of 12 or more members.
A small SARL is directed by a manager to be appointed by a majority of SARL members,
generally through consensus.  The manager can be a shareholder of the SARL or an outsider
whose actions are binding to third party.  For the larger SARL of  12 or more shareholders,
corporate governance  must follow the same rules as for an SA. that is a Board of Directors
to be elected by the General Assembly with the same quorum of 75 percent of total shares
value, two controllers  for internal audits, and so forth.
Regulatory Issues Beyond the Company Law
With the Company Law,  Viet-Nam has created legal forms for private sector
activities.  This is a good beginning to create a legal framework for the emerging private
sector, but many regulatory  impediments remain which constrain actual investment.  A recent
survey of domestic investors'  perceptions  of impediments to investment reveals that
bureaucratic  regulations,  the legal system,  and corruption  are three of the five most serious
obstacles to investment.  (The lack of financing and export difficulties are the other two
impediments listed.)  Predictably,  complicated administrative regulations have been found a
more serious problem than the broad  "laws" such as the Company Law.
A myriad of administrative regulations affect both domestic and foreign investors at
all phases of business operations,  but domestic investors are burdened with more bureaucratic
red-tape.  They are not given the same incentives as FDI.  Viet-Nam investment policy is
inherently biased against domestic private  investors.  In terms of process,  the principal
documents required of domestic investors are found in Article 4 of Circular  No.  141/PLDS-
KT,  dated March 3,  1992, by the Ministry  of Justice, but "concerned  ministries" often
require supplemental documentation.  The approval process is prolonged by the detailed
nature of these requirements and by the multiple steps involved. (1) Application documents
must be prepared  and should include a "business plan" and project proposal  (for industrial
investment) to be submitted it to the concerned Department/Directorate.  (2) Such Department
renders an opinion and forwards it to the local People's  Committee.  (3) This opinion is
considered by the local People's  Committee.  (4) An escrow account should be opened. (5)
The local People's  Committee issues a license.  (6) The business must register with the
Arbitration  Authority.  (7) An application must be made to the Police Department for a
security clearance.  (8) A public announcement appears in the newspaper.  And (9) A business
license tax is paid.  A permit for the establishment of new business units is supposed to be
granted in two months, but the actual steps detailed in the approval process above always
require much longer to complete.  As a result, approvals can take as long as a year
particularly  if the applicant is unfamiliar with the procedure and does not handle the steps
personally.20
V.  Foreign Investment Law and Regulations
The Emerging Legal Framework for Foreign Investment
Viet-Nam introduced its Foreign Investment Law in 1987, before the promulgation of
a more comprehensive reform program in 1989, reflecting the important role in the
government attached to foreign investment in the transition.  The law,  amended in 1990,
constitutes a legal island in that a special regime featuring  both privileges and restrictions
was created to govern only FDI.  The legal enclave strategy is augmented by the real,
physical enclaves in the fonn  of fenced Export Processing Zones  (EPZ)' 8. However,
despite a special incentives package reserved to foreign investors,  Viet-Nam's  legal
framework in general  has been perceived by foreign investors  in a recent survey as the most
serious impediment to their  investment plans in Viet-Nam.
Some of the more important aspects of Viet-Nam's  laws and regulations  for FDI as
set out  in the Foreign  Investment Law of  1987, amended in  1990 and 1992, are reviewed in
this section.  Because this  law does not cover all aspects of legal framework for FDI,
relevant parts  of other laws and regulations (e.g.,  Land Law, Housing Law,  Company Law,
etc.)  will also be discussed.
Entry  and  Exit  Laws
The forms of FDI.  The legal enclave is structured around three specific forms of
business enterprises for FDI are Joint Venture Enterprises,  Contractual Business Cooperation
(CBC) and recently, enterprises with  100 percent foreign-owned  capital.  From a legal point
of view, contractual business cooperation enterprise,  which in a way resembles a partnership,
differs from joint ventures and  100 percent foreign ownership in that contractual  business
cooperation does not have a "judicial person" or  legal person whereas under the other two
forms of FDI,  a new judicial  person is created.  One legal implication is that contractual
business cooperation (CBC) enterprises  are also governed by, in addition to the Foreign
Investment Law,  contractual  laws. Ironically however, a CBC in principle is not allowed to
enter any  "economic contract"  because it is not a juridical person (see Section VI).  But this
is only one of the anomalies in Viet-Nam's  new legal framework.  An important economic
implication is that only joint  venture is entitled to tax exemption and tax holidays which
explains in part FDI concentration in joint  venture enterprises.
To  form a joint  venture, the FDI contribution must be at least 30 percent of total
capital.  The FDI  contribution should be made in foreign exchange, while the local
contribution can be in local currency.  As in China, about 80 percent of all FDI in Viet-Nam
are joint ventures,  and the great majority are with state owned enterprises  (SOE).  Foreign
investors prefer to have SOEs as their local partners mainly because of their having
18  Viet-Nam's  EPZ system was discussed  in detail  in Viet-Nam:  Economic Policy for Transition  To  Open
Market,  a Trade  Policy report by World Bank/UNDP.  September, 1993.21
substantial assets and considerable political clout.  Less than 5 percent of FDIs are 100
percent foreign owned and about 15 percent are in contractual business cooperation
enterprises.  The latter are formed to carry out short-term,  often "one shot," businesses
(e.g.,  one shipment of import or export cargo. often under semi-barter transactions).
Viet-Nam's  company laws (Law on Companies and Law on Private Business)
generally are not applicable to FDI enterprises.  As a result, FDI cannot be undertaken under
sole proprietorship  as provided in the company law but should be under joint venture or
incorporated as 100 percent foreign owned.  Foreign  investors cannot own shares in a
Vietnamese company (except in the banking sector where a recent decision allowed
foreigners to participate up to 30 percent of a bank's  equity) since the company laws require
Vietnamese citizenship for shareholders.  This,  together with other regulatory  requirements
such as the submission of an economic feasibility study, can be construed to prevent FDI
entry through portfolio  investment.  Under the current laws and regulations,  FDI should
come in as a discreet project  reflecting government's  policy preference for "productive"
undertaking (often understood as green field projects) as opposed to commercial
"commodore" ventures.
A Complicated Process of Sanctioning FDI.  A major problem with Viet-Nam's
current regulatory  framework for FDI is its complicated process of approval.  The basic law
on FDI,  the Foreign  Investment Law,  sets out only the principles  and establishes the State
Committee for Cooperation and Investment (SCCI), headed by a cabinet minister,  to be in
charge of FDI.  Subsequent regulatory  laws create a complicated process for FDI approval.
These laws are primarily in the fonn  of decree.  arrete,  and circular for application and create
a myriad of paperwork.  Like China with its complicated FDI  bureaucratic process,  but
unlike Eastern Europe where there is either no process or a simplified process for FDI19,
Viet-Nam has a system of sanctioning investment that involves too many approval agencies
both at the central government20 and local govemnment  levels.  This multiplicity of
approvals,  resulting from overlapping authority,  takes a long time,  much longer than the
mandatory three months from the date of the application as stipulated in the FDI  law.
Change in the law and regulations are needed.  Currently the central authority (Project
Evaluation Committee) in Hanoi evaluates the proposed projects according to nine criteria,
recently consolidated into six, some of them already on the list of five criteria used by
provincial governments (e.g.,  legal status of the company, project  sponsor's  financial
situation, and so forth.  See Appendix I.).  These provincial governments,  like those in China,
19 See Cheryl Gray and William Jarosz,  Foreign Investment Law in Central and Eastern Europe,  opt. cit. For
China, see Zatar Shah Khan. Pattern of Foreien Investment in China, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
No.  1111, March  1993.
20  At  the  central  government,  approvals  are  required  from  eight  agencies  including  the  State  Planning
Commission,  Finance Ministry,  Ministry of Commerce and Trade, Ministry of Science, Ministry of Construction,
State Bank (Central Bank) and  "other Ministries relevant to the sub-sector in question" (Cabinet Decision No. 366
HDBT,  November 7,  1991).22
at times seem jealous over their new found authority as a result of decentralization.  In
December,  1994 (Decree  l91/CP,  December 28.  1994) the government began to address this
issue of overlapping authorities and issued new guidelines to streamline FDI approval
process.  It remains to be seen whether the latest guidelines will be implemented effectively.
Ideally,  the best way to deal with process problems resulting from procedural  laws is
to have no process-as  currently the case in many CEE countries-for  there can be no
"'optimal" process in a large bureaucracy.  The second best solution is to streamline the
process to a minimum by cutting out as much as possible the institutional layers and their
attendant regulatory  requirements.
Termination  and Liquidation of Joint Venture.  An FDI enterprise  is established for a
period of 20 years.  The duration can be extended up to 50 years for projects requiring  long
gestation periods and large investments.  Apart from bankruptcy mechanism (see Chapter
VII), the joint ventures may be terminated by mutual agreement or upon expiration of the 20
year period.  It is not clear whether this time-bound contract is automatically renewable.
The procedure for dissolution of joint ventures,  whether at expiration or prior  to expiration
of contract, consists of the appointment by the Board of Directors of a three member
liquidation committee to settle all pending obligations and liabilities of the enterprise.  In the
case of liquidation at expiration, the committee should be in place six months prior to
expiration date.  (Foreign Investment Law and Application Decree No. 28-HDBT,  June 2,
1991)
Repatriation  and Remittances
Profit Remittances.  Foreign  investors may transfer their share and should do it in the
year in which profit is acttally  made (in practice it has to be made the following year to
affect the profits  actually realized).  Foreign workers in FDI enterprises  may also transmit
their income overseas.  As the Vietnamese currency (the Dong) is not convertible and the
law does not explicitly guarantee the conversion,  there may be a practical problem of foreign
exchange availability for the purpose of repatriation  and remittances.
Repatriation of Capital.  Upon completion of the liquidation process, the remaining
capital can be transferred  abroad over three years in equal installments.  This transfer policy
reflects government's  concern over an orderly management of foreign exchange and foreign
capital flows.  Exceptions,  however,  may be made to allow the transfer over  a shorter period
if the proposed remittance is small, currently  one million dollars or less,  or if the FDI
enterprise  has achieved 80 percent of foreign exchange earnings budgeted.  Because FDI
laws are new, the credibility of this transfer policy for capital as well as for profit remains to
be tested as FDI  matures.23
The Incentives System
Incentives Package Versus  Sound Investment Climate.  Viet-Nam's  incentives package
for FDI is standard, more or less comparable to other Asian countries'  FDI  incentives
systems (see Table 5.1,  Vietnam: Direct Foreign Investment,  Comparative Incentives) to
include in the main (a) a guarantee against nationalization or expropriation  and a guarantee
for repatriation of capital and profits,  and (b) a fiscal incentives package consisting of a tax
holiday of up to two years plus another two years at 50 percent of the tax level, and a
preferential  corporate  income tax rates between 10 percent  - 15 percent (as against the
normal 21 percent  -25  percent  rates) for FDI  in the "priority sectors."  In addition,
machinery, equipment and raw materials (if used for export industries) are exempted from
import duties.  Tax incentives can be important as they would affect the financial rates of
return of project.  However,  foreign investors often feel that incentive packages are not as
important to them as a good investment climate where a policy environment does not
constrain private  sector development.  This policy environment is created by a stable legal
framework,  a transparent and decontrolled regulatory framework,  a relatively liberal labor
regulation,  easy access to utilities, good physical trade  infrastructure (export facilities,
custom clearance),  and a reasonably favorable living environment.  In the case of Viet-Nam,
while the last item applies,  other factors,  particularly the legal framework and other policies
affecting private  sector development,  remain to be perfected.24
Table  5.1  - Vietnam:  Direct  Foreign  Investment  (DFI)
Comparative  Incentives
EPZ and/other Free  Other incentives and/or conditionality
ASEAN  Tax Incentives  Import Tariff  trade
countries  Instruments
Indonesia  None  Duty drawback  Bonded  zones  Joint  ventures  required  of DFIs
Malaysia  Five-year  tax  holiday  Exemption  for  machinery  Loans  from  government-sponsored  banks  available
and  raw  materials  for  approved  R &  D expenditures  tax deductible
l _____________  _____________________________  projects.  Several  EPZs
Philippines  Five  to  eight  years  tax  holiday  - Exemption  for  machinery  Tax incentives  for  projects  in
- Post-operative  tariff  protection  underdeveloped  areas
available  Several  EPZs  -R &  D expenditures  tax  deductible
- Exemption  for  nearly  all  Loans  at concessionary  rates  for  targeted  industries
Singapore  Five  to  ten  years  tax  holiday  imports  including  for  FDI.  Several  Free  Trade  - R &  D expenditures  tax  deductible
Zones
Thailand  Three  to  five years  tax  holiday  Exemption  for  machinery  and  Two  EPZs  - Tax credits  for  projects  outside  Bangkok
selected  raw  materials  - Infrastructure  support  for  large  projects
Viet-Nam  Two years  tax holiday  plus  Exemption  for  machinery  and  Two EPZs  - Lower  corporate  rates  for  FDls  on  "priority  industries"  list
another  two years  tax reduction  raw  materials  for  approved  Other  EPZs  planned  - 100 percent  owned  FDls  allowed
at  50 percent  projects
Sources:  Vietnam:  Foreign  Industrial  Law  and Decrees  (1991)  and  1992 provisions.
ASEAN:  ASEAN  Fiscal  Incentives,  Business  International  and  other sources.25
Resolution of Disputes
Viet-Nam's  Foreign Investment Law allows parties to joint ventures or business
cooperation contracts to choose the Vietnamese Arbitration  Authority or any other arbitration
system as mutually agreeable for the resolution of disputes among themselves (Article 25).
Recognizing the weakness inherent in the courts and the traditional  arbitration system,  the
government  recently created a special "International Arbitration Commission"  associated with
the Viet-Nam Chamber of Commerce & Industry to handle disputes arising under the Foreign
Investment Law.  The commission is headed by a reputed attorney from the South, trained in
the French  legal tradition and presumably familiar with commercial practice in a market
economy.  This new institution is too new to provide any evidence that it will work better
than the existing arbitrator office or the People's  Court system.  Regarding disputes between
foreign investors and the state, Viet-Nam began to enter bilateral agreements with some
capital-exporting countries to set out the mechanism for  settlement.  As project
implementation has been very slow, there have been no major disputes which can test the
effectiveness of the system.  One or two recent disputes over taxation and transfer of profits
earned in some small profitable projects were not brought to formal arbitration but are still in
the process of negotiation for an amicable settlement. In general,  despite  government efforts
to improve the credibility of Viet-Nam legal institutions,  foreign investors  still have little
confidence in the system.
Other Issues and Recommendations for Further Reform
Viet-Nam's  current legal framework for FDI is a legal island of special incentives and
rules created to govern only FDI.  In the short run,  this enclave-type legal framework may
be useful as transitional  instruments to attract foreign investment, but it should be phased out
over time.  For long-term development, a generally good investment climate with a stable
legal framework should replace the enclaves.
A recent sample survey (done as part of the Financial Sector Study) indicated that the
five most important obstacles to investment as perceived by foreign investors are by order  of
importance:  1) legal framework,  2) bureaucratic process and corruption,  3) investment
climate,  4) inconvenience in financing,  and 5) labor management.  Despite government
efforts  to facilitate FDI,  several legal and regulatory issues still constrain foreign investors'
decisions to invest in Viet-Nam or to  implement their already approved projects.
Interestingly,  notoriously poor infrastructure  in Viet-Nam is considered a major problem but
not as difficult as policy/legal impediments.
Corporate Governance.  Regulations on corporate  control and monitoring for FDI
enterprises  are in the Foreign Investment Law,  although this law sometimes refers to the
Company Law.  The form of management of an FDI enterprise  is broadly in line with the
provision of the Company Law to include Board of Management (or Board of Directors),
Director General,  etc.,  but their prerogatives  do not reflect proportionally  shareholders
rights.  Significant differences exist with respect to rules of decision making and other26
aspects.  For example, in a joint venture, the foreign and local partners appoint members to
the board of management in proportion  to their capital contribution.  However,  both parties
have to have at least two representatives each on the board of management regardless of their
capital contribution.  If more than two parties are involved, the minimum number of board
members is one seat per party involved.  The board  of management oversees the operation of
the joint  venture and according to the law it "shall have the power to make decision on all
important matters  in relation to the joint  venture enterprise."  Unlike the Company Law
which refers  Board's  decision making rules to the By-Laws,  for joint  ventures the Foreign
Investment Law stipulates that decisions on "principal matters which relate to the
organization and operation of the joint  venture,  namely its business objectives, business
planning, and key personnel,"  may only be made by a unanimous vote of the board.  This
effectively gives each party involved the power to veto any decisions on these matters.  This
veto provision  is clearly a major impediment to effective management.  All other decisions
have to be made with two-thirds majority.  The chairman of the board is to be appointed by
consensus,  but nothing is said in the law about the chairman's  powers.
Subsector Preference  for FDI: Encouragement  List and Priority List.  Like China,
Viet-Nam has subsector  preferences for FDI.  While China provides  special incentives for
FDI  engaged in export-oriented  industries and high-tech industries, Viet-Nain has a two-tier
approach to special treatment for FDI.  The first tier is a list of five broad subsectors where
FDIs are encouraged and within that list; the second tier is six priority categories eligible for
preferential  tax and other benefits.  The list of five encouraged industries includes:
(1)  large scale industries, export-oriented  and import substitution industries;
(2)  high-technology industries using skilled labor, investment for full employment,
and exploitation of potential resources available in Viet-Nam;
(3)  labor intensive industries using raw materials and natural  resources available in
Viet-Nam;
(4)  construction of infrastructure;  and
(5)  foreign-exchange-earning service industries such as tourism,  ship repair,
airport  and sea-port services, and other services.
The use of priority  lists is not a good idea.  As bureaucracy breeds itself, what in the
beginning was defined to mean a non-binding list of  encouraged industries in many countries
has become over time a bureaucratic  instrument of FDI  screening, particularly  for lending
purposes by financial institutions.  The use of "lists,"  a by-product of inward-looking
development strategy of the  1960s and most popular in South Asia's  countries,  has proved to
be ineffective and counter-productive  in the long run.  For this reason, these lists should be
abolished.
Slow Implementation.  Viet-Nam's  success in attracting  foreign investments must be
qualified by the slow inflow of capital actuaHly  taking place.  Although investment approvals
have risen over the past five years,  implementation has lagged.  As mentioned in Section I,
of a net total US$6.2 billion worth of projects approved as of May  1994, only US$1.5 billion27
or less than 25 percent of the total have been implemented.  So far,  implementation of
foreign investment has been concentrated in the oil and gas sector and in hotel construction
where high profits  seem assured.  Foreign  investment implementation in manufacturing has
lagged, apart from  a few low risk projects  in "soft" sub-sectors such as garment
manufacturing for export and consumer electronics assembly.  Several factors have
contributed to slow project implementation including problems in joint-venture  relationships,
the lack of infrastructure,  labor regulation problems,  import/export  restrictions,  banking
problems,  and also hesitations from project sponsors who still do not have enough confidence
in the current investment climate.  Projects with long gestation periods will only be attractive
to foreign investment, particularly  from Western countries,  when some of the fundamental
impediments such as uncertainties with the legal framework  can be overcome or removed.
VI.  Contract  Law and Dispute Resolution
Evolution of Viet-Nam's Contract Law
Viet-Nam's  law and regulations on contracts  have undergone several changes since
195521 and reflect changes in the country's  economic and political development.  During
the decades of a centrally planned economy,  "economic contracts" of a socialist type
(basically a sale or procurement contract between SOEs) was the only type of contract
recognized in Viet-Nam;  old laws on civil contract remained dormant.  The first  law on
economic contracts,  under the form of a  1955 decree on "Temporary Rules on Economic
Contract,"  set out the rules for the private sector to participate in procurement of goods and
services to an expanded state industrial sector.  This corresponds to the initial stage of
socialism adopted in the North following a partition of the country at the end of the "French
war. "
Following the 1957 socialist reform campaign in the North  where private  business
was practically wiped out, a new set of Temporary  Rules on Economic Contracts was issued
to regulate contractual agreements between state-owned enterprises  which then controlled
most of the productive assets in the economy.  In further keeping with socialist tradition,  a
council of state arbitrators  was established for the first time to resolve disputes over
economic contracts.
Following the 1975 reunification,  a revised set of rules on economic contracts  was
issued (Decree 51CP October 3,  1975) which essentially extended the application of the old
rules on economic contracts to the newly socialist South.  Like the original Temporary  Rules
of 1955, the 1975 rules provide a framework for the private  sector to enter procurement
contracts with the state sector.
21 For  further details,  see Viet Nam  Economic Laws (Luat-Kinh-Te-Viet  Nam),  lectures  for legal training
courses,  Ministry  of Trade Printing  Film,  Hana July,  1991 (in Vietnamese  by several authors.)28
Current  Status
Viet-Nam's current contract law is a hybrid system which incorporates a modified
socialist concept  of economic  contract and a Western (mainly  French) concept  of civil
contract.  The overlapping  of economic  contract and civil contract has caused confusion over
jurisdiction (see below).  Current regulations  on economic  contracts are based on a 1989
Decree-Law (Decree-Law  No. 24-LCT/HDNN8, September 1989) announced  about the same
time as the adoption  of the reform program of Renovation. The new law was intended  to
facilitate  contractual  arrangements in a newly created market economy. But as Viet-Nam
continues  to remain a socialist  country, its new contract law, like many other laws, retains
some socialist features including: a) a special category of plan-based  contracts (contract to
fulfill a particular target in the state plan); b) the state ownership  of all land limits the scope
of contracts particularly regarding sale, transfer, and pledge; and c) disputes over economic
contracts are not to be resolved by the court system but by the Arbitration Authority (see
below).
In principle, freedom to contract is  recognized, but the law on economic  contract
limits the use of this type of contract to "juridical  persons" 22, e.g. a company that has a
juridicial person or between a juridicial person and an individual  who has a registered
business.  Failure to register with the Arbitration Authority  by a contractual  party in an
economic  contract is one of the causes for nullity.
Problems of Economic Contracts
Viet-Nam's economic  contract in its current form resembles a sales contract designed
to facilitate market transactions. It was intended  to serve as a market-oriented  legal
instrument  to replace administrative  directives. However, the current version of economic
contracts that originated from the traditional economic  contracts  between SOEs is not well
defined as a separate type of contract to be different from civil contract.  In 1991, a Decree-
Law on Civil Contract was promulgated  which defined civil contract to include agreements
on purchase/sale, procurement of service, borrowing/lending,  etc. that can be construed  as
encompassing  economic contracts. Economic  contract is a category of civil contract and as
such the law on economic  contract should supplement  the general contract law.  In the same
way the French commercial  contract is part of a broader civil contract framework or a
commercial  contract under Unified Commercial  Code (UCC) is part of U.S. contract law.
But unlike the French concept  which defines commercial  contract in terms of commercial
acts (actes commerciales)  or the U.S.'s UCC which also clearly defines a commercial  act,
Viet-Nam's law on economic  contract is not as well defined.  It is "all written agreements  to
produce or exchange  goods and services, to do research and all other contractual  agreements
22 An entity to which the law attributes a personality,  according to the French concept (also in Louisiana Civil
Code) of "personalite juridique".  Viet Nam's  law on economic contract defines a juridical  person is an entity that
is legally formed,  has its own properties,  is vested with the rights to make independent business decisions and to
"participate  in legal  relationships.'29
serving a commercial purpose"  and would qualify most contracts as economic contracts.
This will raise the issue of choice of laws and problem of jurisdiction  between the
Arbitration Authority that controls economic contracts  (see below) and civil court that is
empowered to adjudicate civil contracts.  This confusion adds to a concern of foreign
investors who are skeptical of the impartiality of state-appointed arbitrators  and,  at the same
time,  do not feel assured of the technical competence of the country's  regular People's
Courts regarding commercial disputes.
Resolution of Disputes
Until recently, enforcement of dispute resolution over economic contracts was handled
by a system of arbitration  which included: a) district and provincial arbitration offices, and b)
a higher level State Arbitration  Office headed by a Chief State Arbitrator  and serves as
highest court of appeal for contract disputes.  The State Arbitrator  also hears cases involving
an amount five hundred million Dong (or $50,000 equivalent) or more and all cases
involving foreign parties in the contract regardless of the amount.  The arbitrators  are
appointed by the Executive Branch and work under the People's  Committees (city or district
governments) or Central Government (for State Arbitrators) although their decisions are
binding like the court's  rulings.  This type of adjudication authority clearly is not
independent, and it might have worked adequately to mediate contractual disputes among
SOEs in a centrally planned economy.  However,  it may not be sufficient for adjudication
purposes  in a mixed economy where contract disputes can arise between more diverse parties
including the state, the private  sector, and foreign investors.
The Economic Court was established  in July,  1994 as part of the People's  Court
system to take over  most economic disputes previously decided by arbitrators.  The
Economic Courts replace the arbitrators  and have been staffed in part by the former
arbitrators.  These courts are intended to function like a circuit court specializing in
commercial disputes.  But the courts are in a formative stage, and their competence and
efficiency remain to be seen.
The laws establishing jurisdiction  of arbitrators  over contract disputes do not explicitly
exclude the courts (the People's  Court system) from adjudication over contract matters.
Pending a new Civil Code under preparation,  Viet-Nam's  current civil procedure is based on
the Decree Law,  July  12, 1989 (15 Chapters,  88 articles), that establishes subject matter
jurisdiction of People's  Court to cover contract (in addition to property,  family law related
matters,  labor disputes,  and approval of election voters listing).  In practice, neither the
courts nor the arbitrators  have much experience in settlements of commercial disputes arising
in a market economy.  This and the weak enforcement of court orders in general make
business people, particularly  foreign investors,  skeptical of contractual arrangements in Viet-
Nam.  Anecdotal evidence is prevalent of breaches of contractual obligations by partners  in
joint ventures with foreign investors.  In the past,  domestic investors often brought their
contractual disputes to be resolved at the District People's  Committee (city government)
instead of going to court or to the arbitrator's  office.30
VII.  Bankruptcy Law
In the context of Viet-Nam's  transition,  bankruptcy law will play an useful role in
both the emerging private  sector and the state sector where thousands of SOEs are in need of
being restructured  or declared bankrupt.  For the emerging private sector, bankruptcy  law
will provide a mechanism for nonviable enterprises to exit and to repay creditor's  claims
according to pre-established  rules.  For the state sector, bankruptcy law has encouraged
many SOEs to undertake  real restructuring  in order to avoid forced bankruptcy. In fact,
several SOEs have already  been in a state of bankruptcy according to the definition of
Vietnamese bankruptcy law because they have long  "lost their ability to repay their debts."
Features
Viet-Nam's  law on bankruptcy,  promulgated in January,  1994, to take effect on
July 1,  1994, features some of both the French and the U.S.  bankruptcy laws.  Predictably,
it also embodies some of the characteristics of the socialist concept of property law (e.g.,
land is not part of the company's  fixed assets to be evaluated for bankruptcy purposes) and
also draws on bankruptcy laws of other socialist countries.  The law defines somewhat
vaguely  that  "an enterprise  is in state of bankruptcy  when it loses its ability to repay its
debts despite efforts  that have been made to undertake financial restructuring"  (Art.  2).  The
law allows for reorganization under  Article 20 which in a way resembles the U.S.  Chapter
11.  Both the liquidation and reorganization  mechanisms are provided in the same law,  not as
separate procedures but like sequential steps of the same process.  Accordingly,  a three-step
process is involved in a bankruptcy proceedings.  1) The court,  upon receiving a request by
the creditor to initiate proceeding  to declare the debtor under "bankruptcy status,"  will
proceed to categorize the creditors  and perform other preparatory  procedures.  2) A
"reconciliation conference"  between debtors  and creditors  must be held to discuss
reorganization as an alternative to liquidation. And 3) only when this conciliation attempt
fails to reach agreement on reorganization within 60 days will bankruptcy be declared and
liquidation proceed.  The assets of the bankrupt enterprise  will then be placed under control
of a "management task force"  (trustees) presided over by a judge of the provincial economic
court and made up of representatives  of the court, creditors,  the enterprise  in question, the
union,  and other relevant agencies and organizations.  This  is one area where Viet-Nam's
shortage of specialized skill will be a problem for receivership.
The law allows both creditors  and debtors to initiate proceedings.  Creditors can file to
force the debtor's  bankruptcy  after 30 days following the repayment falling due.  There is no
deadline for the ailing enterprise  to file for voluntary bankruptcy.  In keeping with socialist
orientation,  it also allows unions or representatives of workers  (if there is no union) to file
for bankruptcy of the enterprise  if the firm failed to meet the wage bill for three consecutive
months. In practice,  it is unlikely that labor will exercise this right in view of the current
high rate of unemployment in Viet-Nam.  The law does not contain an  "automatic trigger"
clause presumably to prevent  massive liquidation of a great number of loss-making SOEs.31
Since a reconciliation phase is part of the process,  Viet-Nam's  law resembles the
French bankruptcy  law that does not allow liquidation to  start before an "observation phase"
is concluded.  During the reconciliation conference,  creditors and the company in question
must reach an agreement within 60 days on a plan for debt rescheduling,  for paying overdue
salaries, and for enterprise  reorganization.  The law does not have special provision to cover
foreign direct investment (FDI) enterprises,  although an earlier draft of the law proposed
foreign investors can file for bankruptcy with the state arbitrator.  The State-Owned
Enterprise  Law also provides exceptions to protect certain SOE industries:  a) sick
enterprises  in strategic sectors may secure financial assistance from the government and are
subject to bankruptcy proceedings only after one year of rehabilitation following government
bailout; and b) force majeure cases of enterprises in distress,  i.e.,  due to natural disaster,
may seek a time-bound exemption from bankruptcy law coverage.
Issues
The main issue with bankruptcy law in the current  context of Viet-Nam's  transition
involves the lack of a solid legal infrastructure for the reorganization process to work.  To be
effective,  whether the reorganization  schemes are under  Chapter 11 or the French concept of
reorganization  under the "observation phase,"  they require strict legal standards in related
legal areas such as contract enforcement, accounting rules, and so forth.  This brings home
the point about a workable legal superstructure  would require a solid legal infrastructure.
Since the private  sector began emerging only three years ago, the current  bankruptcy
law will have greater  implications on the state sector. Apart from the normal objectives of a
bankruptcy law, the existence of such a law on the books may serve as a threat to sick SOEs
and an incentive to restructure  themselves.  In the long run, this type of law is necessary to
provide nonviable enterprises  with an orderly way to exit.  For the time being, however, the
strict application of bankruptcy law for Viet-Nam's  SOE sector would probably result in
massive liquidation with tremendous attendant social costs because 70 to 80 percent of all
SOEs are either  loss-making or functioning at a break-even point.  Emphasis should be
placed on reorganization.  Because the draft law has no "automatic trigger" clause, the
government  should use this opportunity to accelerate its program of SOE reorganization
before making the law on bankruptcy operative.  During the past three years,  progress has
been made in this direction. For example, the government has dissolved about half of the
SOEs because of their loss-making or being unprofitable.  In May,  1994, the total number of
SOEs was 6,544 units,  down from  12,214 in 1989 at the beginning of the Reform.
Assuming that with time all the legal requisites and safety nets are in place,  it appears
that Viet-Nam's  bankruptcy laws may be improved by introducing an automatic trigger  clause
to require mandatory filing after,  for example,  180 days in arrears.  (Current law allows
filing for forced bankruptcy as early as 30 days in arrears,  and this seems to be too severe a
provision.)32
Experiences with bankruptcy  in socialist countries trying to transform  their economies
are not extensive because most of them have introduced their bankruptcy laws during the past
two or three years,  not much earlier than Viet-Nam.  Experiences from market  economy
countries in the West23 are perhaps  more relevant in terms of procedural  law than in terms
of substantive law as the latter varies considerably among countries.  For example, both U.S.
and French bankruptcy laws allow both creditor and debtor to file for a bankruptcy
proceeding while France also allows the Commercial Court to ask for bankruptcy proceeding
on the ailing enterprise.  Apparently France's  bankruptcy law adopted under the current
socialist government places great emphasis on reorganization in consideration of employment.
Under the U.S.  law, the debtor's  management remains in control during reorganization.
Under the French  law,  the enterprise  management is placed under a court-approved
"administrator"  who may actually operate the enterprise during  the "observation" phase.
Thus different  countries have different substantive laws on bankruptcy management,
reflecting different choices and legal traditions.  The provisions  of bankruptcy will have to
change when the goals of using bankruptcy as an instrument change along with the
development of a capital market and further expansion of the private  sector.
As Viet-Nam is moving closer toward a market economy, it may do well to use the
bankruptcy law as an incentive for SOEs that have become a burden in the banking sector to
undertake real  restructuring,  not just  financial restructuring.  For both the state and private
sectors,  the procedure  for voluntary filing for bankruptcy should be elaborated and
strengthened.  For example, under voluntary proceeding,  the company can continue to
manage its assets under court's  supervision.  Currently,  the law simply mentions that the
ailing enterprise,  after unsuccessful attempts at reorganization,  should file for bankruptcy,
but the law provides  no other details.
The law can be improved further  in other ways. For example, the law allows the
court to inform creditors that a particular enterprise  is in a state of bankruptcy when the
court discovered this during an unrelated court case, "so that creditors  can initiate bankruptcy
proceeding against the enterprise"  (Art.  10).  This provision,  introduced on behalf of public
interest,  may be justifiable  in the current context of Viet-Nam where a credit  rating system
does not exist but will become inappropriate and should be removed when the market
economy matures.  The treatment of priority  among claims also deserves reconsideration.
Currently,  secured claims receive lower priority than both tax claims and wages (first
priority).  This provision reflects Viet-Nam's  political orientation,  but it also constrains the
participation of the banking system in trade/industrial  financing through secured credits,
particularly  in term financing.
23 Apart form literature of bankruptcy on specific countries, a good general discussion can be found in Douglas
G. Baird, "A World without Bankruptcy,"  Law and Contemporarv Problems,  Vol. 50, No. 2,  Spring 1986, T.H.
Jackson,  The Logic and  Limits of Bankruptcy Law, Harvard  University  Press, Cambridge,  1986.33
VIII.  Issues on Competition
Viet-Nam's private sector is only emerging, and there is no over-concentration  or
monopolies. As private industry and trade become more mature, Viet-Nam will need laws to
guard against unfair competition. To facilitate  exits, Viet-Nam already has its bankruptcy
law in place (see Section VII).
Dominance  of the State Sector
The dominance  of the state sector in several areas of industry and trade perverts the
competitive  environment  and crowds out the private sector.  Currently, the state sector
accounts  for about 70 percent of total industrial output, owns almost all large scale
industries, controls 81 percent of capital in the industrial sector, and absorbs nearly 70
percent of total bank credit.  The state-owned  commercial  banks accounted  for almost 90
percent of commercial  bank operations, and the government  still holds a monopoly  in the
insurance industry.  Efforts to improve efficiency  of SOEs in certain subsectors and to
stimulate  competition  are often constrained  by ideology. Despite the Reform, the constitution
continues  to stress that "SOEs should  be developed  particularly in key areas and assume the
lead role in national economy" (Art 19) which is in keeping with the spirit of maintaining  the
"production  organization  based on state ownership (SOE) as the fundamental  form of
production in a multi-sectoral  economy" (Art.15).  Because of ideology, this preference for
state owned enterprises will probably remain in the constitution  as a matter of principle as
long as the country remains socialist.  This will continue  to cast a shadow over government
intentions  and policies toward private sector activities.
Subsector  Restrictions
Three areas of law and policy can be changed both to expand  the private sector and to
improve competition. The first area is a restriction imposed  by the 1990 Law on Private
Business (see Section  IV) which lists seven sectors that requires permission from the prime
minister.  Article 5 of this law lists the following sectors requiring the permission of the
prime minister: (1) production and trading of explosives, poisons, toxic chemicals; (2)
exploitation  of all kinds of precious minerals; (3) production and supply of electricity and
water on a large scale; (4) production of facilities  for communication  broadcast, services
related to post and telecommunications,  radio and TV broadcast, publishing; (5) sea and air
transport; (6) import-export  trading; and (7) international  tourism.  Many of these sectors are
but routine activities by the private sector in a market economy  and should be liberalized.
Capital Requirement  Restrictions
The second area is the minimum  capital requirement (as distinct from paid-in capital)
set out in the Company  Law for almost every business activity from operating a steel mill to
running a barber shop.  This provision should  be removed  because it is an unnecessary,
bureaucratic nuisance. If maintained,  it should be updated frequently  to be accurate. This34
updating makes the unlikely assumption that government officials  have detailed knowledge of
what is the minimum efficient capital for each type of trade or industry.  In fact, current  data
for  "minimum efficient capital" prepared by large financial organizations,  such as the World
Bank, for even major industries for project  appraisal purposes are always a matter of running
debate.  This kind of data should be used as information, not as binding requirements in a
law.
Trade Policy Restrictions
The third area is foreign trade law and regulations.  Viet-Nam's  current trade policy
is highly protective,  featuring both quantitative restrictions  and a widely dispersed tariffs
structure.  Such a highly protective trade regime is both biased against export activities  and
will not promote  efficiency of domestic industry.  Viet-Nam's  current  tariffs schedule
contains as many as 25 rates varying from  1 to  150 percent  C.I.F.  values.  Variation  in
tariffs are harmful-even  more harmful than high but uniform tariffs-  because they tend to
shift resources  into inefficient activities.  Viet-Nam's  trade law is biased also against the
private  sector because it requires several conditions for the private sector to engage in
foreign trade without being producer at the same time.  One of these conditions is an
approval by the prime minister  himself.  As a result,  foreign trade has become a virtual
monopoly of SOEs.  Only a handful of private companies (about 14) obtained permits to
engage in import/export  activities in their own name.  Other foreign trade firms  have to go
through one of 800 SOEs who hold trade permits and act as intermediaries for a fee
(officially, a commission of  1 percent  is charged).  The need for Viet-Nam to liberalize
foreign trade has long been a subject of debate within the government and by aid donor
countries.  The government has taken some initial steps towards liberalization,  but further
progress will be slowed by resistance from protected interest groups,  a mind-set control
attitude of policy makers, and their  lack of understanding of the complex relationship
between trade liberalization and growth.  Under these constraints,  Viet-Nam's  international
competitiveness beyond some traditional exports will be slow to improve.
IX.  Judicial Institutions
Prior  to the 1989 Reform,  Viet-Nam's  court system played almost no role in
commercial disputes.  With the transition  into a market economy, the court system has been
reactivated and new laws promulgated.  It  will be some years before the revived court system
will become efficient because the laws are new to both the people and the judges  who, for
the most part,  lack appropriate training and experience.  In view of this deficient adjudication
system, commercial disputes often are settled out of court.  In the medium term, therefore,
Viet-Nam's judicial  institutions will do little to advance the development of the private
sector.  This section reviews  some of the main aspects of Viet-Nam's  current judicial  system
focusing on commercial disputes.35
Unstructured  Legal Environment
Until 1989, most of the legal texts in Viet-Nam were in the form of decree,
ordinance,  decision,  and circular all promulgated or issued by the executive branch (by the
prime minister of a minister).  These laws and regulations were made on an ad-hoc basis as
the need arose,  and often they conflicted with one another.  In practice,  administrative
decisions dominated most areas of the legal framework.  The National Assembly,
strengthened by the 1992 Constitution,  began integrating these texts into laws and enacted
new statutes, particularly  in basic laws, e.g.,  the 1992 Law on Organization of People's
Courts (October 6,  1992).
Despite considerable progress  in making new laws, Viet Nam's  legal framework
remains largely unstructured and informal.  During the war years, the government  ruled by
decrees.  But unlike the war years,  there is currently a proliferation of laws, particularly
regulatory  laws.  These laws came in avalanches and were replaced by others prepared  with
little care.  As a result, an unstable and unpredictable legal environment was created.  The
latest example concerns land use rights where the controversial decree No.18,  February  13,
1995 created considerable confusion as it attempts to abolish long term land use rights
already acquired for business activities and replaces them with leases (see Section II).
Overlapping of authority between legislative and executive branches and inconsistent
standards set out by multiple levels of government are not uncommon.  For example, in the
area of real property rights,  an administrative circular  (Circular 297, October 2,  1991) added
to the state property all houses whose owners are absent, including properties  that have
become state property as a result of various  socialist reform campaigns (Art. 3). The circular
also requires citizens who leave the country to be reunified with their families to surrender
their houses for "state management."  Under stricter rules of constitutionalism,  this kind of
regulation can be construed as encroachment on legislative power as the distribution of real
properties  between state and individuals and their disposition should normally be in the
domain of lawmaking by legislature.  More frequent are instances of overlapping regulations
issued by different layers of the executive branch,  e.g.,  between central government and
provincial governments.  For example, in the area of foreign investment, apart from a basic
law requiring an investment project be assessed for approval purpose by the Central
Evaluation Committee at the central government level, Ho Chi Minh City also issued a
People's  Committee decision (October 5,  1992) requiring the project to be first examined on
the basis of the same criteria as the Central Evaluation Committee.  The duplication of
authorities resulted in uncertainty and increases in transaction costs.
Poor implementation of the law and weak enforcement of court orders  are common in
most areas of the law in part because of low efficiency and limited experience of the
judiciary.  For example,  in the jurisdiction  of Ho Chi Minh City with the largest number of
lawsuits every year, for a variety of reasons including corruption,  only less than half of all
judgements  get enforced.  According to data from the Office of Court Decision
Implementation of Ho-Chi-Minh  City, out of a total of 30,551 court decisions rendered in
1994, only  11,335 or 37% were enforced.  (In 1993, only about 30% of court decisions got36
enforced). In the banking sector, commercial  banks find it difficult to foreclose properties
pledged as collateral  for bank loans because of poor enforcement  of court orders in addition
to the lack of foreclosure  procedure.  The inefficiency  of the law enforcement system has
frustrated the public in general and led business people to prefer to settle their commercial
disputes mostly  out of court.  It also frustrates  practicing attorneys, and "some of them are
just not taking the risk of arguing with the judges in court and just use the back door". 24 In
general, the lack of information,  the lack of consciousness  of the citizens  of their rights, the
lack of independence  of the judiciary also contributes  to the difficulties of Viet-Nam's legal
system. Laws and regulations  are not often kept secret or unpublished,  but they are
confusing. In many areas, such as contract law and banking law, the new laws often are
legislated  in a hurry to meet the need of the transition. They tend to be general in nature
and, as a result, have seen wide discretion in their application. In these situations, decisions
made by officials in charge of implementation  are often personalized  as interpretation  of the
laws vary among  government offices and between provinces.
Source of Law and Judicial Review
Source of Law.  The current sources of law in Viet-Nam  are almost exclusively  in
legislation  (mostly in decree-law,i.e  the statutes  passed by the Standing  Committee  of the
Parliament, when Parliament is not in session) and administrative  regulations. "Case law" is
nonexistent. On the whole, only the laws in the foreign economic sector, particularly foreign
investment  are going through a process of research/consultations  (with international
authorities  in the field).  Law making for the rest of the legal framework, particularly
"private  laws" governing  domestic business and personal relations is lagging behind.
Regulatory  laws are in abundance  not only in "administrative  law" as normally expected but
also in other traditional  fields of civil law and commercial  law.  The statutes themselves  -
particularly when they are in the form of decree-law  - are often either too broad or poorly
drafted, requiring a great deal of explanatory  regulations  beyond the usual, already detailed
"decree of application". For commercial  laws, investors, particularly foreign investors, often
have to rely more on these regulations  than on the law itself for their understanding  of what
the law requires.  Eventually,  most of the laws will be codified; for the time being only
criminal law and criminal procedure were put in "Codes" (December  12, 1992). For the
more complicated  areas of civil law and commercial  law, it will probably take some years
before the relevant  planned codes can be enacted. In civil law, a revised draft (draft no. 12)
is being circulated among lawyers, legislators, and media. Until all laws are codified,
investors and the public will have to continue working with legal texts in various forns.
24 Tai  Van Ta  Legal Reform  for Trade.  Investment  and  Economic  Development  Harvard  Law  School-
Mimeograph.  Paper presented at the Seminar on "Viet-Nam: The Emerging Tiger".  at the University of California
at Berkeley, in May,  1994.  The paper also reported that in 1992 the court was able to enforce only 11,594 cases
out of a  total 32,803 judgements  rendered.37
Precedent cases are not a source of law despite the country's  long years of pre-war
experiences with using judicial precedent in the context of civil law.  Judicial activism is
currently  neither favored nor practiced.  This  is in part in keeping with socialist legal
tradition,  in part due to the background of the judges  who often have but simplified legal
training.  The function of the judge  is essentially to apply a predetermined  law to the facts of
the case.  The Supreme Court,  apart from being the highest court of appeal,  has an
additional function of supervising the adjudication by lower courts.  In doing this, the
Supreme Court  sometime tries to explain the law for the application by lower courts,  but this
authority of interpreting the law formally belongs to the Standing Committee of the National
Assembly (Article 91 of the Constitution).  Furthermore,  the Constitution also allows the
National Assembly to overturn decisions by the Supreme Court.  (See below).
Judicial Review.  Although the new Constitution (1992) provides that  "all other laws
must be in accord with the constitution (Article  146), Viet-Nam's  Constitution does not
provide for judicial  review of laws. The National Assembly reviews its own legislation;  it
has the power  of "abolishing legal texts promulgated by the chief of state, by the Standing
Committee of the National Assembly, by the prime minister,  by the supreme court and by
the procuracy  if these legal texts and decision are deemed unconstitutional or against the laws
and/or resolutions adopted by the National Assembly" (Article 84-9 of the Constitution).  In
practice, the authority to review laws is delegated to the Standing Committee which has the
power to  "suspend" law deemed unconstitutional and propose for abrogation.  This absolute
law making authority of the National Assembly is in keeping with its general supremacy in
government structure  as established in Article  83 of the Constitution.  This reflects the
adopted concept of "centralized democracy"  (Article 6) in which all government  branches
report to the National Assembly whose members are screened as candidates by the
Communist Party or the Father Land Front,  an arm of the Communist Party.  Because of this
election process,  the direction of law making in effect  rests with the Party.
The Court System
For the purpose of settling commercial disputes,  Viet-Nam's  adjudication system is
confusing.  At the beginning of the transition following the Reform in  1989, the government
attempted to improve the adjudication system for commercial disputes by introducing new
laws to strengthen its arbitration  system which existed during the period of centrally planned
economy.  Soon this piecemeal reform proved to be inadequate to handle complex economic
litigations in a market economy.  The government recently reverted to the court system and
in July,  1994, created a new economic court to handle "economic litigation." Because the
definition of "economic litigation" is vague, there is no clear division of jurisdictions
between the arbitration system,  the economic court,  and the ordinary civil court.  But often
business people tend to avoid the formal system altogether and prefer to settle disputes
between themselves.
Viet-Nam's  courts are structured into three hierarchies,  i.e.,  courts  of original
jurisdiction,  intermediate courts of appeal at the provincial level, and the Supreme Court.  A38
central feature of this People's  Court system is the collegial adjudication panel of three
members including two "people assessors"  or lay assessors who have the same powers as the
judge.  (The economic court has two professional judges  and one lay assessor.)  In the trial
court, the judges  as well as the lay assessors decide both questions of law and fact.  This is a
cause of concern for litigants in disputes involving complex issues of law,  such as
commercial disputes.  As Viet-Nam's  system of dispute resolution is basically inquisitional,
as opposed to the adversary  system in common law, the quality of the professional judges
themselves is crucially important. This is another area of concern as legal training in Viet-
Nam is very much in transition  and the professional quality of the judges  is uneven.
Independence of the judges,  the courts,  and of the judiciary branch in general is a
relative matter in the context of socialist Viet-Nam where the judiciary  is not regarded as an
equal of the government.  The constitution does not state the principle of separation of
powers;  it also requires the People's  Courts to safeguard not only the socialist legal system
but also the socialist regime itself (Art.  126).  The President of the Supreme Court,  as head
of the Judiciary Branch,  is responsible to the National Assembly.  Similarly, the chief judge
of lower courts at provincial and district levels are to report to their corresponding local
People's  Councils.  All judges below the rank of the President of the Supreme Court are
appointed by the prime minister.  This,  and the fact that the judges are not appointed for life,
does not promote their independence.  In real life, private businesses as well as ordinary
citizen have long lost their faith in the court system which is perceived as incompetent and
corrupt.
Procuracy
Viet-Nam's  Procuracy  is typical of a  socialist legal institution that has no counterpart
in any Western  legal system.  Comparatively,  the procuracy has the power far beyond of a
U.S district  attorney or the French  public prosecutor.
According to the Constitution (Art.  137), the People's  Procuracy has the power to
supervise the legality of all government acts "to ensure that all government's  acts and actions
are legal, to serve as public prosecutor and to ensure that laws are implemented seriously and
uniformly."  Unlike the common law,  the procuracy  can also intervene in a civil law suit
(see Appendix II).  As such, the procuracy  can play an useful  role in commercial litigations
and can contribute to the functioning of the emerging market economy.  But in reality,  it is
more active in prosecuting criminal cases for which it is better  equipped.
The Procurator  General (Chairman of the Procuracy) is appointed by and responsible
to the National Assembly.  As such, the procuracy is,  in theory, a government branch of the
same standing as the Supreme Court.  In practice,  the Procurator  General is not only the
most powerful jurist  in the legal system,  but also politically influential in view of his role as
guarantor of socialist rule of law.39
Because of its broad  powers, an activist procuracy could threaten party and
government control.  On the other hand,  the procuracy  is also required by the Constitution to
safeguard the socialist regime which would make the role of the procuracy  quite delicate in
critical times.
In sum, Viet-Nam's  current court system is not independent.  It continues to be
constrained by ideology.  Another salient feature of Viet-Nam's  judicial institutions is that
despite formal institutions,  the legal environment continues to be unstructured and informal.
The laws exist on the books, but enforcement is weak.  The notion of  "due process of law"
can be seen reflected in both substantive and procedural  laws (see Appendix II), but in
practice,  few people believe in due process.  Because of this,  investors and private  sector in
general often avoid bringing their litigations to courts but prefer  settle their disputes among
themselves or with the help of the district People's  Committee,  regarded as more effective
than the court.  Foreign  investors, particularly  those from the West, find this unstructured
adjudication system unreliable because they are used to a stable, formal legal environment.
The government is aware of this and has created an "International Arbitration  Commission"
to handle contractual disputes involving foreign investors,  but the institution is too new to
provide any evidence whether it will be more effective than the existing court system.
CONCLUSIONS
1.  To facilitate the transition  of Viet-Nam toward a market economy, the Foreign
Investment Law was introduced in  1989 and amended in  1992.  A number of new laws have
been introduced  since then.  Efforts  to improve other areas of the legal infrastructure,  such
as law enforcement,  the court system, and resolution of disputes are,  however,  not
comparable with law making.  This  has resulted in a emerging framework featuring a
superstructure  made of new laws not adequately supported by a solid legal infrastructure.
Viet-Nam's  current legal framework remains largely informal and unstructured.  It had been
that way during a very long period prior  to the transition  to a market economy.  Private
investors,  particularly  foreign investors,  have found Viet-Nam's  legal framework the most
serious impediment to investment. This,  in part, explains the slow rate of implementation (25
percent) of foreign investment projects approved.  Policy changes to reverse the command
system without an appropriate legal framework in place may be sufficient to initiate the
transition,  but are not enough for long-term development.
2.  Ideology continues to constrain the development of a legal structure fully oriented to
private  sector expansion and market-based economic development in this socialist country.
The private  sector is constrained  in many areas: the lack of an independent judiciary,  the
absence of private land ownership,  other uncertainties in property  law which constrain
financial market development, and the inherent bias of the system in favor of the state sector
(and collective ownership).40
3.  A good,  solid formal legal framework  requires a law-abiding attitude which is slow to
cultivate.  More intense efforts  should be concentrated in the areas of law enforcement. It
would be a mistake to introduce new laws without parallel efforts to effectively implement
them for the laws are only as good as they are enforced.  Good implementation of existing
laws would contribute to creating a climate of predictability and stability which is crucial to
decision making by private investors,  in particular  foreign investors.
4.  Entry laws, particularly  the Foreign Investment Law and the Company Law,  are
crucial to expanding the emerging private sector.  However,  Viet-Nam's  foreign investment
process  is too complicated, and its company law is quite restrictive.  The streamlining of
regulatory  laws should be the first priority.  Many of these regulations may be amended or
changed through  administrative decree  rather than going through  the legislative process.
Simplifying regulations  is particularly  important for investment promotion-FDI  and
domestic investment.  An easy,  transparent  regulatory framework may be more important to
a foreign investor than special tax and investment incentives.  Investment  "process" of
approval or sanctioning should be abolished or should change from control-based to
promotion-based.  Similarly, unnecessary restrictions  in the company law should be removed.
5.  Unlike Eastern  Europe, Viet-Nam's  private  sector has not been expanded by
privatization as efforts to privatize the large state sector have not gone beyond
experimentation on a small number of SOEs.  The continuing dominance of SOEs in
industry,  foreign trade,  banking, and other sectors is a major impediment to competition
necessary for the sound development of a private  sector already constrained by a restrictive
legal framework.  The accelerated privatization of SOEs is crucial to both enlarging  the
private  sector and to increasing competition.  Viet-Nam's  trade law,  with high tariffs and
quantitative restrictions  also needs to be reformned  to strengthen the country's  international
competitiveness.
6.  Legal enclaves,  such as export processing  zones (EPZs),  may be useful in the short
term as transitional instruments to attract foreign investment but should be phased out over
time.  For long-term development, a good investment climate with a strong legal structure
should replace the enclaves.  While the special incentives system for FDI  is  maintained in




Most legal texts are published  by "Nha Xuat-Ban  Phap-Ly, Hanoi" (Legal Text
Publishing  House, Hanoi) which as its name indicates, specializes  in legal texts.  The laws,
decrees and other legal texts cited in this study were also published  by several other
publishing  houses.  Below in parentheses, the Vietnamese  titles are followed  by the names of
the publishing  houses.
Land Law in Vietnamese  (Luat Dat Dai by Nha Xuat-Ban  Thanh Pho Ho-Chi-Minh, 1993)
Banking Laws in Vietnamese  (Van Ban Phap-Ly ve Ngan-Hang  by Nha Xuat-Ban
Phap-Ly, Hanoi, 1993).
Foreign Trade Laws in Vietnamese  (Van Ban Phap Luat ve Xuat Nhap Khau by Nha Xuat-
Ban Phap Ly, Hanoi, 1992).
Foreign Investment  Laws in English and Vietnamese  (Luat Dau Tu Ngoai Quoc by Nha
Xuat-Ban  Phap-Ly, Hanoi 1992.  This publication  also includes  the decree-law on
Intellectual  Property and the Company  Law).  The Foreign Investment  Law has been
published by several other Publishing  Houses and are available in most bookstores in
Viet-Nam.
Bankruptcy  Laws in Vietnamese  (Pha San va Xu Ly Pha San by Nha Xuat Ban Thong Tin
Chuyen De, Hanoi, 1993).
Company  Law and Enforcement Procedure for Civil Court Decisions, both in Vietnamese
(Luat Cong-Ty and Phap Lenh Thi Hanh An Dan Su by Nha Xuat-Ban  Chinh Tri
Quoc Gia, Hanoi, 1993). Company  Laws were also published  by Arbitration
Authority  in Hanoi (Trong Tai Kinh Te, Hanoi).
Business Registration  Laws in Vietnamese  (Nhung Qui Dinh ve Dang Ky Kinh Doanh by
Trong Tai Kinh-Te Long-An, 1992).
Draft of the Civil Code in Vietnamese  (Du Thao Bo Luat Dan-Su by Nha Xuat-Ban  Tuoi-
Tre, March 1995).
Criminal Laws and Criminal Procedure both in Vietnamese  (Bo Luat Hinh Su, and Bo Luat
To Tung Hinh Su by Nha Xuat-Ban  Chinh-Tri Quoc-Gia, Hanoi, 1993).
Administrative  Laws in Vietnamese  (Phap Luat ve Xu Phat Hanh Chanh by Nha Xuat Ban
Thanh Pho Ho-Chi-Minh, 1993).42
Civil Procedure  in Vietnamese (Cach thuc Khoi Kien va Thi Hanh An Dan Su by Hoi Luat
Gia Thanh Pho My-Tho).
Family Laws in Vietnamese (Van Ban Phap Luat ve Hon Nhan va Gia Dinh by Nha Xuat
Ban Phap Ly,  Hanoi,  1992).
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Appendix I:  Viet-Nam's Process of Foreign Investment Approval
A foreign investment project  is to be evaluated according to nine criteria:  1) juridical
persons of the project  sponsors and their financial situation; 2) the extent to which the project
is in line with Viet-Nam's  strategy on economic and social development; 3) the rationale of
the product mix and appropriateness of the technology; 4) the extent to which the project
responds to demands deemed appropriate by government  policy; 5) considerations  on tax
exemptions and rents;  6) economic and social benefits and interests of the local counterparts
and of the government; 7) infrastructure  available to project implementation; 8)
considerations  regarding location and construction;  9) environmental considerations.  Clearly
many of the above criteria are not only complicated but also vague leading to varied
interpretations and personalized  decisions and corruption.
A new decree issued in December,  1994 (Decree No.  191/CP December 28,  1994,
effective January  1,  1995) consolidated the nine criteria  into six criteria,  but they still contain
the same requirements.  This decree clarifies what constitutes the "interests of the State of
Viet-Nan  and the Vietnamese counterparts"  in joint ventures.  A major change in the
regulations  involves large projects of at least $40 million, called category A, which must be
approved by the prime minister.  Previously,  no investment amounts were  specified for large
projects that need approval by the prime minister.  Projects less than $40 million now have
to be approved by the SCCI chairman.
Ho Chi Minh City's  provincial circular  (October 5,  1992) established a new
evaluation unit to exist in parallel with the local State Committee for Cooperation and
Investment  (SCCI) and the central SCCI. Hence, an FDI project proposal in Ho Chi Minh
City has to go through three layers of approval:  (i) eight copies of the project proposal
should be submitted to the city People's  Committee and its local committee for  Cooperation
and Investment Evaluation (Project Evaluation Committee of the city) for evaluation;  (ii)
following a clearance from the City People's  Committee, the local SCCI will review the
project to ensure it is in "good order"  before passing on (eight copies) to the central SCCI;
and (iii) the central SCCI will approve or reject the project upon recommendation of the
Central Project Evaluation Committee chaired by the chairman of State Planning Committee.
A complicated approval process for FDI and for investment in general is not unique
to Viet-Nam's  transition  economy but common to most developing countries regardless of
political orientation.  However,  skepticism and lingering suspicions vis-a-vis  "capitalist"
investors also play a role in Viet-Nam's  control-based FDI approval system.  Improvements
can still be made along with other procedural  streamlining by collapsing the three-step
process into a single one in which local governments no longer have a duplicate role with
SCCI.
The number of approval agencies at the central level can also be reduced to less than
the current eight. For example, the Central Bank (State Bank of Viet Nam) should be46
involved, if at all, only at a later stage of implementation,  when foreign exchange is
required.  Similarly the ministry of science may have a role later when transfer of new
technology may become an issue.  The State Planning Commission should not be burdened
with project review when the country has done away with the concept and practice of central
planning.  The reduction of the number of approval agencies also strengthens the authority of
SCCI and is an essential step towards being the contemplated one-door service institution,
something only very few developing countries have achieved.
Viet-Nam's  FDI law also requires all FDI  applications to include a feasibility study.
As long as the country still has trade barriers,  the government would be interested in the
economic analysis (which should be done with the use of proper  shadow pricing) to ensure
that the project  is not "harmful"  in the economic sense, e.g.,  not in negative value-added
industries-at  world prices.  Most,  if not all, of the feasibility studies submitted to  SCCI are
only pre-investment studies: they are subject to further detail engineering studies prior  to
project  implementation.  But even if these studies are sufficiently detailed and properly done,
these analyses are most useful only to financing institutions which should gauge the financial
viability of the project in making their lending decisions.  It should be noted however that the
whole problem of economic analysis would be immensely reduced by moving the incentives
structure close to world prices.  In the meantime,  feasibility study, particularly  economic
analysis therein  should be required for large projects only but not for  small/medium scale
projects.Appendix II
Appendix II:  Procedural Laws and Due Process of Law
Procedural Law.  Viet-Nam has procedure  laws for both civil (decree-law Nov. 29,
1989). With criminal cases (Code of Criminal Procedure IX, Jan.  1, 1989), with the
exception of the role of the procuracy,  Viet Nam's  civil and criminal procedures  draw
broadly on t4e French  codes.  Three features of the Viet Narn's  procedure made it distinct
from Western legal systems namely: (1) the role of procurator  in a civil suit,  (2) higher
courts can take up at will for their own adjudication any lawsuits being processed  at lower
courts,  and (3) a procedure  for retrial by committee of judges,  called "directorate
adjudication"  (giam-doc tham) somewhat akin to administrative review.
As mentioned, the procurator  can intervene at any stage of a civil suit (Article 28,
civil procedure decree-law) on grounds of safeguarding the socialist (state) properties,  of
looking after the interests of workers in labor disputes,  and of preventing  certain unlawful
domestic relations, e.g.  unlawful marriage.  In these areas, the Procurator  can himself
initiate the lawsuit if no other interested parties seek actions.  For an investor, the fact that
the procurator  can get involved in a civil suit could complicate the litigation process  since the
investor will have one more party to deal with, the government itself through the procurator.
In terms of subject matter jurisdiction,  the trial court is the district court where  most
of civil law suits, including labor disputes and civil contract disputes (except economic
contracts),  and tort disputes can be adjudicated except when the law suit involves a foreign
litigant in which case the provincial court will have jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court can pick
up a lawsuit filed at a lower court for adjudication; in this case, the Supreme Court's
decision is final.  (Article 11 of Civil Procedure Decree-law)
Both civil procedure  and criminal procedure  allow for retrial through a procedure
called "directorate adjudication."  The retrial is not done in a regular court but by a panel or
committee of judges  (Directorate).  The grounds for triggering  this procedure  are more or
less the same as for appeals,  namely inadequate inquisition (similar to discovery under
common law (Article 71, Decree-law  of Civil Procedure,  Article 242 Code of Criminal
Procedure).  Action for retrial can be filed within three years following the final judgment.
To the extent a final judgment  may not be conclusive (as should normally be under the
principle of Res Judicata),  litigants, particularly  investors in commercial disputes,  will find a
sense of legal insecurity as a result of this procedure of retrial.  This particular procedure  has
some similarities with administrative review in the American and some other Western legal
systems.  It is not found in other socialist legal systems.  The rational for the procedure is
perhaps the governmental's  desire to add another layer of appeal in order  to compensate for
any deficiencies in the current  court system.
Due Process of Law.  Viet-Nam's  constitution does not use the term  "due process of
law" but guarantees citizen's  property against nationalization, provides for compensation in
case of nationalization,  and requires that all arrests  and imprisonments be done according to
the rule of law.  This and other stipulations in the criminal law and procedure  also seem to48
suggest the equivalent of due process  of law.  But there are constraints and limits to how and
what can be involved to dispute a law.  First as mentioned, Viet-Nam has no judicial review
of laws. The legislature reviews its own legislation and other laws by other government
branches.  Even if a law can be disputed, the question of whether or not a legislation be in
furtherance of a legitimate governmental objective  - a central objective of substantive due
process  - should be understood in the context of a centralized democracy (Art. 6 of the
Constitution) in which the Communist Party is "leading the State and the Society" (Art. 4).
The notion of  "compelling government  interest" as often invoked under the notion of
substantive due process,  can be broadened by the government under this  system of
centralized democracy.  Similarly a law which may restrict  "fundamental rights",  e.g.,
freedom of speech, freedom of association,  etc.,  while considered as violating substantive
due process in other societies,  may not be inconsistent with centralized democracy.  For the
same reasons,  the notion of procedural  fairness or procedural due process can also be subject
to government  interest considered legitimate by Viet-Nam's  government  and its particular
political system.  In other words,  due process of law in the Vietnamese legal framework
must be related to factual context and ideology.  Like in other countries, due process  of law,
or the equivalent of it, is not a fixed notion.  Its content will probably change with time and
circumstances.  For the time being, Viet-Nam's  procedural  fairness  seems better observed  in
ordinary criminal cases than in cases involving security.  It is also better practiced  in major
cities than at district and other local levels.IPolicy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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